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Creating a list of fundamental human rights is a controversial
project, but there is one right that appears in many lists-a right to bodily
integrity, security, or control over one's own body.' The content of what
the right should be is hotly contested.2 For instance, does the right to
bodily integrity require that organ selling be forbidden? 3 Or, do funda-
mental rights require that organ selling be permitted? 4 What about sales
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I. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (recognizing a right to "bodily integrity"); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 72, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10,
1948), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/88/IMGNR004388.
pdfOpenElement (stating in Article 3 that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person"); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 78 (2000) (listing bodily integrity as one of ten "central human functional capabilities").
2. See, e.g., Stephen R. Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in Body Parts, in
PROPERTY RIGHTS 259, 261 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1994); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy,
and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 360-63 (2000) (describing the American constitutional
right to bodily integrity and the fact that it has the character of a privacy interest-not a property
interest-in that it protects against state interference, but does not protect a right to alienate the
interest); see also Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology
in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 511-12, 546 (2003) ("[T]he result may soon be,
among other things, patents on human fetuses that are genetically modified in ways one can only
imagine. Patent protection could convert such fetuses, to the extent they are denied constitutional
protection, into justifiable commodities, supplying life-saving tissue and organs to sick children and
adults.").
3. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 99 (1986); HASTINGS CTR., ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
PERTAINING TO SOLID ORGAN PROCUREMENT: A REPORT OF THE PROJECT ON ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION 3-4 (1985); Munzer, supra note 2, at 266 (describing the Kantian human dignity
argument as applied to organ sales); see also Susan M. Shell, Kant's Concept of Human Dignity as a
Resource for Bioethics, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 333, 344-45 (2008), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/
reports/human dignity/human dignity.and-bioethics.pdf.
4. Cf Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Pay-
mentfor Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1835 (2007). Volokh based his argument not in a right to
"bodily integrity," but in a right to self-defense. Id. at 1815-16.
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of the use of one's body, such as prostitution? Do we violate fundamen-
tal rights by permitting the practice?5 Do we violate fundamental rights
by forbidding it?6 What about the sale of manual labor that is injurious to
the body?7 In other words, there is deep disagreement about whether the
right over one's body and its uses is a property-like right that must be
alienable in exchange for money, or is a dignity or privacy-like right that
must not be sold.
In this article, I argue that both sides are off the mark. The concept
of a monolithic, fundamental right to bodily "integrity" is both descrip-
tively and normatively wrong. There should be no legal "right to control
one's own body," saleable or not, with a scope that matches up perfectly
with the physical borders of the organic, physically continuous human
body. This is not to say that we should abandon many familiar rights
such as the right to not be tortured or raped. Rather, it is to say that there
should be no one-to-one mapping between the physical borders of the
organic, integrated human body and the legal borders of the rights de-
rived from it.
For instance, once we determine the relationship between our bo-
dies and fundamental rights, we might not derive any freedom to resist
vaccination (although certainly other rights, such as religious rights,
might protect this freedomS). On the other hand, we might be led to pro-
tect freedoms of dress and makeup, even though these activities do not
5. See Stephanie Farrior, The International Law on Trafficking in Women and Children for
Prostitution: Making it Live Up to its Potential, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 213, 218 n.24 (1997) (noting
the argument made by Coalition Against Trafficking in Women that prostitution "usurps and negates
prostitute women's right to human dignity, bodily integrity and physical and mental well-being");
Jane E. Larson, Prostitution, Labor, and Human Rights, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 677 (2004)
(pointing out that the view-"any form of prostitution is a human rights violation"-is supported by
the 1949 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others where it states that "prostitution and ... traffic in persons for the purposes of
prostitution are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person").
6. See Int'l Comm. for Prostitutes' Rights, World Charter for Prostitute Rights, in A
VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WHORES 40, 40 (Gail Pheterson ed., 1989), available at
http://www.walnet.org/csis/groups/icpr.charter.htm; Norma Jean Almodovar, For Their Own
Good: The Results of the Prostitution Laws as Enforced by Cops, Politicians and Judges, 10
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 123 (1999) (arguing that the subsidiary effects of criminalizing pros-
titution is "violative of human rights and dignity"); Larson, supra note 5, at 681 (describing argu-
ments for legitimizing prostitution on the grounds that it "is a free choice made by an autonomous
individual" and that "[riespect for women's self-determination requires respect for female choices
about sex and survival"); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 262 (1989).
7. See, e.g., RABBINICAL COUNCIL OF AM., POLICY STATEMENT ON HUMAN DIGNITY AND
LABOR (1987), http://www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id=101063 (describing the fact that "workers
in chemical factories may be exposed to dangerous chemicals or radiation, the effects of which are
not recognized or diagnosed for many years" as compromising human dignity, to explain a position
supporting "legislation that will raise the standards of employment" in that and other industries).
8. E.g., Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 91
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that under the First Amendment, religious exemption to New York's
mandatory inoculation program for school children must be extended to all persons who sincerely
hold religious beliefs, and not just persons who are bona fide members of a recognized religious
organization).
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involve the manipulation of one's organic, physically continuous human
body.9 Similarly, the relationship of the body to fundamental rights might
lead us to regulate contracts entered into between patients and sellers of
prostheses, despite the fact that prostheses are not human. On the other
hand, we might not find a justification for either prohibiting or permitting
blood sales.' 0
In Part I, I argue that those who promote an inalienable or noncom-
modifiable right to bodily integrity-a right that cannot be exchanged for
money-fail to recognize the fact that possession is not the only impor-
tant right in a physical object. Even when the sale of possessory rights in
body parts is prohibited, the sale of use and exclusion rights in the body,
such as the sale of manual labor, are permitted, and these sales can cause
the same sort of physical harm and risk that sale of possessory rights can
cause. Indeed, I show that even market exchanges in the possession and
use of non-human objects can cause the same sort of physical harm and
risk that property rights in parts and uses of the human body can cause.
This is increasingly the case given dependence on medical and other
technological devices for sustaining life and health. In sum, those pro-
moting dignity-based rights in the organic, integrated, human body that
cannot be alienated for money are descriptively wrong about the body's
complex relationship to its surroundings.
In Part H, I argue that those who favor a property-like right to pos-
sess and use the human body and its parts free from limits neglect the
fact that property and contract rights can be regulated: ownership of an
object does not entail sole dominion over the object. Thus, even if "your
body is your property," that does not entail a fundamental right to free
markets in bodies, their parts, and their uses. In other words, those pro-
moting property-like rights in the organic, integrated, human body that
must be alienable for money, as a matter of fundamental rights, are de-
scriptively wrong about property.
In Part III, I argue that as a normative matter, we should not use
dignity or autonomy arguments to promote any monolithic right to bodily
integrity, whether alienable or not. However, my critique of a monolithic
concept of a right to bodily integrity, demarcated by the organic, human,
physically integrated body's borders, still leaves room to justify a more
nuanced version of rights in the body. Thus, I consider dignity and au-
tonomy as approaches to justifying more nuanced rights in the human
9. Cf Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing,
Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 60-69 (2006).
10. However, there may be other, purely policy-based, non-rights-based justifications for the
regulation of those transactions, such as public health. See, e.g., RICHARD TiTMUSS, THE GF"
RELATIONSHIP (1970), reprinted in THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL
POLICY, 57-315, at 314 (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds., 1997) ("[C]ommercial markets are much
more likely to distribute contaminated blood; the risks for the patient of disease and death are sub-
stantially greater.").
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
body, ones whose legal borders may not line up with the human body's
physical borders. I conclude that dignity as a basis for singling out the
body and prohibiting these sales is too arbitrary for a pluralistic society.
Autonomy as a basis for prohibiting the regulation of these sales ignores
the inevitable presence of economic and cultural coercion. Finally, I con-
sider and critique the capability approach to justifying nuanced rights in
the human body, since it arguably solves many of the problems identified
with dignity and autonomy.
Nevertheless, all this critique need not bring us to the conclusion
that human or fundamental rights have nothing to say about torture, pros-
titution, or forced labor. In Part lV, I propose that the body's relationship
to fundamental rights can be rooted in a proceduralist approach-such as
the use of fundamental fights to promote a dynamic, evolving culture-
just as speech rights are thought to promote political and cultural
processes. The reason is that the body is uniquely "personal and politi-
cal."" The body is especially personal because it grounds our subjective
experience, the experience that others cannot directly access. But the
body is also especially political because it is a primary site for exploring
different values, subcultures, and identities. This means that to avoid a
stagnant culture, we should use fundamental rights to avoid the consoli-
dation of control over individuals' bodies, whether in the hands of the
state or in the hands of economically powerful actors. Avoiding such
consolidated control is a key component of ensuring that the formation of
identities, subcultures, and cultural values is not directed by a powerful
few.
This way of justifying the relationship between the body and fun-
damental rights does not lead to either an inalienable "right to bodily
integrity" or to a particularly alienable "right to control one's own body."
Under this approach, the organic, integrated body no longer marks any
border between what we have human or fundamental rights in and what
we do not. To demonstrate, in Part VI provide some tentative examples
of how we would apply this view to questions such as state intrusion on
the body, rights to modify one's own body, prostitution, organ selling,
and the regulation of property and contract due to its effect on bodies,
such as patent law, employment and housing law, and welfare law. In-
stead of creating fundamental rights to protect "bodily integrity" in these
situations, we should create fundamental rights where necessary to avoid
monopolies over bodies.
11. "The personal is political" was coined by members of New York Radical Women, includ-
ing Carol Hanisch, in the late 1960s. JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER & AMY RICHARDS, MANIFESTA:
YOUNG WOMEN, FEMINISM, AND THE FUTURE 19 (2000).
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I. WHAT THE DIGNITY OR PRIVACY VERSION OF BODILY INTEGRITY IS
MISSING DESCRIPTIVELY: BODIES DEPEND ON ENVIRONMENTS
There may be simple utilitarian policy reasons to regulate or dere-
gulate particular instances of body commodification. For instance, some
argue that prohibiting blood selling improves the quality of the supply of
blood. 12 Others argue that permitting prostitution would increase eco-
nomic and social welfare. 13 But in this article, I focus on rights in bodily
use and possession that would trump these typical political concerns of
increased economic welfare, public health, or the expression of a socie-
ty's cultural values through law. 14 In other words, should constitutional
law, human rights law, or other forms of counter-majoritarian law have
any role in these debates? If so, what should those rights in bodily use
and possession look like?
There is a great deal of disagreement over this question, but one
significant class of views on the subject relies on the following concern:
the commodification of the human body's uses or components risks harm
to human dignity, or perhaps privacy or personhood, in a way analogous
to the way that slavery, the ultimate commodification of the human body,
does. 15
For this set of views, affording the formal legal status of property to
the body or its uses and parts is problematic because it threatens what is
often described as a fundamental right to human dignity.' 6 Alternately, it
is described as threatening a fundamental right to bodily integrity, 17 re-
spect for the sacredness or sanctity of human life, 18 religious moral man-
12. See, e.g., TITMUSS, supra note 10, at 206, 270, 314.
13. E.g., Almodovar, supra note 6, at 127 ("'Quality of life' is a subjective concept and the
least impressive argument for the continued harassment, arrest and incarceration of a group of
people who are trying to improve their quality of life by earning a living."); Martha C. Nussbaum,
"Whether from Reason or Prejudice": Taking Money for Bodily Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693,
696 (1998) ('The legalization of prostitution, far from promoting the demise of love, is likely to
make things a little better for women who have too few options to begin with.").
14. Cf Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 115 (2007)
(arguing that "individuals naturally impute socially harmful consequences to behavior that defies
their moral norms," thus supporting law that "repress[es] morally deviant behavior" while "honestly
perceiv[ing] themselves to be motivated only by... harm prevention").
15. See MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS
194-96 (2006) (describing authors opposing commodification of body parts on the grounds that it is
like slavery); see also DAVID B. RESNIK, OWNING THE GENOME: A MORAL ANALYSIS OF DNA
PATENTING I-7 (2004) (describing controversy over DNA patenting that includes slippery slope
arguments ending in slavery).
16. E.g., sources cited supra note 3.
17. E.g., Rao, supra note 2, at 387-88 (describing the American constitutional right to bodily
integrity and the fact that it has the character of a privacy interest, not a property interest, in that it
protects against state interference but does not protect a right to alienate the interest).
18. E.g., Proclamation No. 8339, 74 Fed. Reg. 3955 (Jan. 15, 2009) (proclaiming the Presi-
dent's designation of January 18, 2009 as National Sanctity of Human Life Day); Daniel C. Dennett,
How to Protect Human Dignity from Science, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at
39, 40 ("Human life, tradition says, is infinitely valuable, and even sacred .... "); William P. Clark,
Op-Ed, For Reagan, All Life Was Sacred, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at A27, available at 2004
WLNR 5467725.
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dates,19 or "personhood .,,20 This is part of the justification provided for
prohibitions on organ selling 21 and prostitution. 22 It is not just moral con-
servatives who fit within this camp, however. There are disability rights
activists, those who are concerned with the rights of sexual minorities,
and egalitarians who oppose, on dignitarian-type grounds, leaving the
modification of bodies up to markets.
The argument might go as follows: A ban on slavery means that
humans are fundamentally ineligible for the legal status of property-
that which persons (including corporations) may both exercise control
over and alienate, either in whole or in part, and often in exchange for
money. 23 Therefore, to allow for property rights in parts or uses of hu-
mans would blur the line between humans and property. This would
threaten dignitary rights in our own bodies, respect for our own bodies,
and perhaps even respect for human dignity itself.2 4 Of course, there are
more nuanced objections to commodification of the body,25 but many of
them share a reliance on the concept that some set of commodification
practices threatens human dignity, a fundamental aspect of "personhood"
such as bodily integrity, or some similar universal concept such as a fun-
19. E.g., Vatican Bishop Points to Modem Social Sins, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 11,
2008, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/new.php?n=12031 (reporting the inclusion of "'bioethi-
cal' violations such as birth control" and "'morally dubious' experiments such as stem cell research"
in a list of seven modem social sins released by the Vatican via an interview with Bishop Girotti);
see also Nicola Gori, The New Forms of Social Sin, L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Mar. 9, 2008, avail-
able at http://blog.acton.org/uploads/penitentiary-interview.pdf (interview with Bishop Girotti).
20. E.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1852, 1885
(1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability]; see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES 55-56 (1996) [hereinafter RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES]; Margaret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1014-15 (1982) [hereinafter Radin, Property and
Personhood].
21. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 96; Munzer, supra note
2, at 266 (describing the Kantian human dignity argument as applied to organ sales).
22. E.g., Susan Estrich, What I Could't Teach Spitzer at Harvard Law, REAL CLEAR
POLITICS, Mar. 13, 2008, http://www.realclearpolitics.comarticles/2008/03/what-i-couldntteach_
eliotcspi.html:
I really believe it is none of my business, as a member of the public or the media, if a po-
litical or business leader has an affair. I don't sit in judgment of other people's marriages
or their private lives. But prostitution isn't just sex. Prostitution objectifies the women
who engage in it, dehumanizes sex and sexuality, and turns both into commodities with a
price tag.
See also Ann Lucas, The Currency of Sex: Prostitution, Law, and Commodification, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION 248, 248 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) ("[Mlost objec-
tions to prostitution are commodification-based.").
23. STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 48-49 (1990) ("Property rights are body
rights that protect the choice to transfer."); Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 20, at 1854 n. 19
("Traditional property rights are alienable in all senses except cancellation; they may be forfeited,
relinquished, waived, condemned, and transferred by both gift and sale.").
24. See, e.g., DAVID B. RESNIK, OWNING THE GENOME: A MORAL ANALYSIS OF DNA
PATENTING 1-7 (2004) (describing the controversy over DNA patenting that includes "slippery
slope" arguments ending in slavery).
25. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 2, at 455-56 (arguing that a principle in accord with our intui-
tions on the subject would allow for property rights in body parts that have been detached from a
person, but would not allow for property rights in parts still internal to a person's body).
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damental human "capability" 26 for bodily integrity. The idea has roots in
Catholic thinking,2 7 and also appears in a Kantian argument that human
dignity requires persons not to make these sales.2 8 Bioethics committees
and advisory boards commonly use the fact that something involves body
commodification as a reason to be ethically concerned about it.
29
The public approach to this question-whether commodification of
the body is per se problematic-is somewhat schizophrenic, especially in
the United States. Selling of organs is forbidden by statute, 30 and blood
banks will not keep sold blood; yet some plasma centers use purchased
blood.31 The sale of manual labor is permitted, including physically inti-
mate manual labor such as massage therapy. Even payment to volunteers
who are willing to have their colons and vaginas invaded by medical
students learning how to perform various exams is permitted.32 However,
prostitution is forbidden in most of the United States.
Nevertheless, arguments against various practices of body commo-
dification, on the grounds that commodification of the body is proble-
matic to dignity or personhood, continue to have a great deal of purchase,
despite the existence of practices ranging from plasma selling to the
largely uncontroversial sale of physical labor.33 The view that there is
something threatening about assigning the legal status of property to
people or parts of people, at least some of the time-for instance, when
the part of the person is not detached 34 -continues to have a great deal of
26. NUSSBAUM, supra note I, at 78 (listing bodily integrity as one of ten "central human
functional capabilities"). It is important to note that although Nussbaum supports an intuitionist,
seemingly dignitarian approach to developing her list of capabilities, and although bodily integrity
maintains a place on her list, her specific views on how to apply those capabilities to law do not
necessarily lead to anti-body-commodification positions. For instance, Nussbaum has elsewhere
argued for the legalization of prostitution. See Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 723-24. On the other
hand, Radin has derived from Nussbaum's capabilities approach and concept of human flourishing a
stance against some forms of commodification. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 20, at
64, 93-96.
27. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, SHARING CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 5
(1998), available at http://www.archdiocese-chgo.org/departments/peace-and-justice/pdf/teaching-
doc/sharing.social-t.pdf ("[T]he Catholic Church proclaims that human life is sacred and that the
dignity of the human person is the foundation of a moral vision for society.... [This belief] is the
foundation of all the principles of our social teaching.").
28. See Munzer, supra note 2, at 259; Shell, supra note 3, at 344-45.
29. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 96; see also The
President's Council on Bioethics, http://www.bioethics.gov (last visited Nov. 2, 2009) (listing
"Property in the Body" as one of its main "Topics of Council Concern"). The Council was disbanded
on June II, 2009. Nicholas Wade, Obana Plans to Replace Bioethics Panel, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
2009, at A24, available at 2009 WLNR 11613820.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006).
31. Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and the Blood Supply: An Analysis of Law, Regulation, and Public
Policy, 74 WASH U. L.Q. 913, 942 n.163 (1996) (describing the move in the United States towards
an all donated blood supply, as encouraged by FDA regulations).
32. See Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 701, 706.
33. See id. at 693 ("ALL of us, with the exception of the independently wealthy and the
unemployed, take money for the use of our body."); Salbu, supra note 31, at 944-46.
34. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 2, at 455-56 (arguing that a rule forbidding property rights in
body parts when the parts are internal to a person, but permitting property rights in body parts when
detached from a person, would fit best with our intuitions).
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force. Even anxiety about prostitution, which involves the sale not of a
body part, but rather of a service employing the physical body, is often
expressed in the terms that it is a commodification of the body.35
However, it is not the specter of human parts or even humans hav-
ing the formal legal status of property that makes slavery and indentured
36servitude so horrifying, or markets in human body parts so worrisome.
In other words, we should not rest our concern with these practices on a
formalist idea that humans or human parts having the legal status of
property is itself an affront to some definition of what it means to be a
human, to some concept of inviolable dignity. This focus is descriptively
misplaced, as it relies on an overly simplistic conception of the relation-
ship between humans' bodies and their environments. Whatever human
dignity or personhood means, property rights already threaten it, even
where the line between property and persons is clear.
For instance, if we prohibited the sale of possession rights in bodies
and their parts, the sale of use rights would still pose risks to dignity in
the sense of health, physical well-being, and physical independence:
"The precedents for making use of one another's bodies are sufficiently
well established in manual labor. . . ."37 But manual labor often causes
changes to the body over time, such as repetitive stress injuries. Suppose
person A sells use of her hands until their function is so impaired that she
requires assistance to get dressed and lives with constant pain. Suppose
person B sells possession of her blood, or even a kidney, but remains
healthy and relatively pain-free. Although person A "merely" sold the
use of her body, and person B sold a possessory right to part of her body,
can we say that the laborer has somehow risked or harmed her bodily
dignity less?
On the other hand, it would be infeasible to go so far as to prohibit
sales of use rights in the body because this would prohibit all wage labor.
The use of person A's body was commodified not just when she was
injured, but even when she sold the "labor of animation." 38 And a profes-
sor commodifies the use of her body by agreeing to stand in front of a
35. E.g., sources cited supra note 22.
36. See GOODWIN, supra note 15, at 198:
Slavery's pernicious effect is not exclusively derived from a market evaluation in the
human body. Indeed, many slaves were given away as gifts.... The villainy of slavery is
best characterized by the creation of a chattel system wherein Black men, women, and
children were explicitly and exclusively exploited; stripped of their humanity, tortured,
bred, denied legal protection, forbidden educational instruction and religious expression.
37. Martyn Evans, The Utility of the Body, in OWNERSHIP OF THE HUMAN BODY:
PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE USE OF THE HUMAN BODY AND ITS PARTS IN
HEALTHCARE 207, 207 (Henk A.M.J. Ten Have & Jos V.M. Welie eds., 1998).
38. Sarah S. Jain, The Prosthetic Imagination: Enabling and Disabling the Prosthesis Trope,
24 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 31, 32 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Elaine
Scarry, The Merging of Bodies and Artifacts in the Social Contract, in CULTURE ON THE BRINK 85,
97 (Gretchen Bender & Timothy Druckery eds., 1994)).
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classroom for specified periods of time and talk about particular subjects,
using her mouth, lungs, and brain.39
One might imagine that we can separate the professor example from
the prostitute or someone engaging in manual labor based on whether the
work is typically thought of as selling the "use of one's body"-whether
the work is culturally viewed as bodily work. But even work not typical-
ly thought of in this way could raise concerns about bodily dignity. For
example, an employer who requires an employee to wear particular
clothes has not in fact required the employee to change his organic, phys-
ically continuous body. Most would not describe such an employee, pre-
suming he is not a model, as having sold the use of his body. However,
the clothes worn may have an effect on the employee's body so signifi-
cant that it cannot be cognitively overcome. Suppose the clothing re-
quired is high heels. Walking about in high heels is an entirely different
bodily experience than not, even if we leave aside the possibility of long
term injury to the body that can stem from wearing high heels. Or sup-
pose the clothing required is tight jeans, skirts with petticoats, or other
physically uncomfortable or cumbersome attire; is this somehow less
physically intrusive or cognitively overpowering to the worker than the
process of having one's blood withdrawn for sale, or an employer's re-
quirement that one's fingernails be trimmed? Umberto Eco has described
the experience of wearing tight jeans as so physically affecting that it
makes him write differently. 40 For many persons, the tight jeans require-
ment is far more intrusive than the fingernail-trimming requirement, and
for some, it would even be experienced as more intrusive than a require-
ment to obtain a vaccination.
It is not just sales of the use of one's body that can cause the same
sorts of physical harm or dignitary intrusions that sale of the parts of
one's body can. Even the exchange of use or possession rights in com-
pletely inorganic material which has no attributes of personhood can
result in the same type of threats to bodily integrity or self-control that
property rights in human parts are thought to raise. For instance, it is
completely unremarkable for property rights to exist in electronic gad-
gets. But we might be concerned if owners of patents on products such as
pacemakers and robotic arms were permitted to enforce "end user license
agreements" ("EULAs") 41 against patients. These EULAs could in effect
restrict what patients can do with products that have become merged
with their own bodies. And we should rightly, I argue, be similarly con-
39. Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 704 (constructing this example).
40. UMBERTO ECO, Lumbar Thought, in TRAVELS IN HYPERREALITY 191, 193-95 (William
Weaver trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1986) (1983).
41. An End User License Agreement is a contract that dictates the terms under which an end-
user can use software or a device. Users often become a party to these contracts without reading
them due to their length and form. See Kevin W. Grierson, Annotation, Enforceability of "Click-
wrap" or "Shrinkwrap" Agreements Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet
Transactions, 106 A.L.R. 5TH 309, § 2(a) (2003).
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cerned with the effects of property rights in wheelchairs, cochlear im-
plants, tools used in labor, and other such devices on the bodies of those
who need or desire to use them.
If that example is too sui generis, we can consider that exercise of
even the most mundane property right-the right to develop real estate-
can affect the bodily dignity of others. If that property right is unregu-
lated with respect to the installation of wheelchair ramps, then how prop-
erty holders choose to exercise the right will have far-reaching effects on
the mobility and lived bodily experience of persons who require wheel-
chairs to get around. Whether such persons' bodies are "disabled" or not
will depend on how those property rights are exercised. And yet, the
property holders will have had this effect on others' bodies without hav-
ing physically "touched," possessed, or used the bodies of the persons
using wheelchairs.42
In other words, we can construct many examples where someone
has exercised property-like rights over something other than possession
of a person or its parts, yet has entailed significant effects on another's
lived physical experience. Some of the examples involved the exercise of
possession and use rights over non-human objects, while other examples
involved the sale of use rights in a human or its parts. In some of these
examples, the effects on lived physical experiences are even more signif-
icant than the effects of selling possessory rights to a part of the body-
selling blood, for instance. The reason we can construct these examples
is that bodies, like any other objects, have a complex relationship with
their environment. 43 Just as failure to provide a neighbor with an ease-
ment can affect the neighbor's ability to use his property,44 failure to
install a wheelchair ramp can affect another's ability to use his body.
This is why refraining from physical intrusions on the human body
does not necessarily match up with maximal dignity for the person.
There are many ways for the dignity or integrity of bodies to be very
significantly affected by cultural norms, markets in items other than bo-
dies, and political rules. Once we recognize that our physical and social
42. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REV. 397,
429 (2000) (describing an acceptance of the social model of disability in the United States, in which
"disability is attributed primarily to a disabling environment instead of bodily defects or deficien-
cies" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability,
Sexuality and Law: New Issues and Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 97, 101 (1994));
Mairian Corker & Tom Shakespeare, Mapping the Terrain, in DISABILrrY/POSTMODERNITY:
EMBODYING DISABILITY THEORY 1, 2-3 (Mairian Corker & Tom Shakespeare eds., 2002) (describ-
ing the shift from medical model of disability to social model, in which activists raised awareness of
the fact that impairment alone does not cause disability, but rather social and economic conditions
overlaying impairment).
43. See sources cited supra note 42.
44. For instance, an easement by necessity can be required to ensure that another's parcel of
land has road access. E.g., Wilson v. Smith, 197 S.E.2d 23, 25 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973) ("A way of
necessity arises when one grants a parcel of land surrounded by his other land, or when the grantee
has no access to it except over the land retained by the grantor or land owned by a stranger.").
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experience of our bodies cannot be easily isolated from the environment,
we can see why simply drawing a physical line between persons and
property should not satisfy any concerns we might have with bodily dig-
nity, even if we could agree on what dignity means. We should not be
satisfied that we have protected persons physically by defining person-
hood so as to include, as most accounts do, bodily integrity.45 As a de-
scriptive matter, this approach is too simplistic.
While the fiction of a human body that could ever be made totally
free from "intrusion" or given complete "integrity ''46 continues to retain
purchase in debates about activities such as organ selling and prostitu-
tion,47 it is about to face a profound challenge: developments in biotech-
nology have already begun to result in very obvious physical mergers of
human and non-human parts and entities. For instance, in the case of a
pacemaker or a robotic arm, humans are merging with inorganic property
of the sort that is routinely and uncontroversially commodified.48 In the
case of merging plant genetic material with human genetic material, hu-
mans may merge with property that is organic, but which is nevertheless
still routinely commodified.49 In the case of merging human and animal
genetic material, transplanting an animal organ into a human, or growing
a human organ inside an animal, humans may merge with organic prop-
erty that is legally, but controversially, commodified.5 ° In some ways this
merger is nothing new.5' As I've argued above, very common forms of
property such as real estate can have significant effects on the lived phys-
ical experience of our own bodies. 52 However, developments in biotech-
nology are making this fact more visible. In the long run, as these mer-
45. E.g., JAMES HUGHES, CrrITZEN CYBORG: WHY DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES MUST RESPOND
TO THE REDESIGNED HUMAN OF THE FUTURE 73, 229-31 (2004) (arguing for "personhood-based
Icyborg citizenship' versus 'human racism,"' yet nevertheless asserting that personhood requires
self-ownership of bodies); NUSSBAUM supra note I, at 78 (including "bodily integrity" in her list of
capabilities).
46. See DONNA J. HARAWAY, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-
Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century, in SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF
NATURE 149, 150 (1991); Jain, supra note 38, at 43.
47. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 3, 21, 22.
48. E.g., Brian Mockenhaupt, Rebuilding: Bryan Anderson, ESQUIRE MAG., Mar. 2008, at
184, available at 2008 WLNR 25444912.
49. See generally Michael D. Rivard, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Person-
hood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1425, 1434-41 (1992) (describing processes for creating transgenic species).
50. See Elizabeth L. DeCoux, Pretenders to the Throne: A First Amendment Analysis of the
Property Status of Animals, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 185, 220-21 (2007) (describing the suc-
cessful implantation of human embryonic stem cells into mouse embryos, and the resulting mouse-
human hybrids, which had a small amount of human brain cells fully integrated into their brains
otherwise made up of native mouse brain cells).
51. Some argue that humans are "embodied in an extended technological world," rather than
existing as "distinct beings in an antagonistic relationship with their surroundings." Robert Peppe-
rell, The Posthuman Manifesto, KRITIKOS, Feb. 2009, http://intertheory.org/pepperell.htm; cf
HARAWAY, supra note 46, at 150 (attempting to disrupt the naturalization of the human body and of
gender, but without seeking to be innocent or transcendent of the systems of power and coercion that
socially construct gender and the body).
52. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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gers between people and property become more common, sustaining
different formal legal statuses for people and other objects may appear
more and more arbitrary.
Prostheses such as robotic arms are likely to become common in
part because the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced hundreds of
amputees, spurring large increases in funding for prosthetic technology.
Amazing developments in the field are occurring.53 Researchers at the
University of Pittsburgh, for instance, have recently announced the suc-
cessful development of a robotic arm that a monkey can learn to control
sufficiently to pick up and eat food, using only a small device installed in
its brain.54
Transgenic species, or entities which include DNA from two differ-
ent species, have already been created.55 The species appear to exhibit
phenotypic characteristics of both species.56 Animal-human "hybrids" or
plant-human "hybrids" 57 might someday be useful for growing or devel-
oping replacement organs or tissue for humans, as one example of the
drive behind this research.58
This prominent merger of humans and property has raised a great
deal of anxiety over how we may avoid the state of legalized slavery or
other related threats to human dignity. For instance, recent scholarship on
"patenting people" has concerned itself with the mixture of human and
animal parts, especially genetic material.5 9 This scholarship expresses
fear that because human genetic material can currently be patented legal-
ly, and has been, eventually animal-human hybrids with many human
characteristics may be patented, and perhaps even turned into a slave
class.60 The specter now exists of a farm of highly intelligent pig-human
53. See Mockenhaupt, supra note 48, at 184 ("Funding for prosthetics projects has swelled
significantly over the past six years. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA,
is bankrolling one of the most ambitious programs, the $85 million Revolutionizing Prosthetics
project to build a prosthetic arm that matches the human ann in functionality by next year .... The
fusion of man and machine is upon us, the extraordinary enabling the everyday.").
54. Benedict Carey, Monkey Thinks, Moving Artificial Arms as Own, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2008, at Al, available at 2008 WLNR 10097697.
55. See DeCoux, supra note 50, at 222.
56. Id.
57. Politicians have referred to animal-human hybrids, probably meaning both chimeras and
transgenic species, where chimeras contain cells from two different entities, and transgenic beings
contain DNA from two different entities. See Stephen Munzer, Human-Nonhuman Chimeras in
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124 (2007) (providing these defini-
tions).
58. See Bagley, supra note 2, at 505-06.
59. Id. at 506-07.
60. See, e.g., id. at 502, 511-12. Indeed, in 2006, Cardozo Law School hosted an entire two-
day conference on the legal, moral, and policy implications of patenting human DNA, human-
animal hybrids, and other biotechnological innovations. Numerous law professors, government
patent lawyers, and others presented arguments at this conference, at which Bagley was the keynote
speaker. See Margo A. Bagley, Keynote Address at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Patent-
ing People Conference (Nov. 12, 2006).
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hybrids being raised for removal of their kidneys and slaughter.6' Proper-
ty rights in human genetic material are thought to also threaten humans'
rights to do as they will with their own bodies-their own genetic ma-
terial. A patent-holder on genetic material might, for instance, prevent a
person with that material from reproducing.
62
Some of the literature has drawn on these fears to simply oppose the
technology that blurs the line between humans and property. The opposi-
tion ranges from proposing outright bans to moderate "think before we
act" proposals. 63 This opposition literature finds itself in alliance with
religious conservative activists who also oppose technologies that blur
the line between humans and non-humans. 64 These religious activists
argue that without a rigid definition of humans, encompassing everything
from embryos to persons in irreversible vegetative states, the degradation
of human dignity will eventually result.
65
In contrast, some argue that we must simply update our definition of
what a legal person is to potentially include entities that are not com-
pletely human.66 On this view, armed with a proper definition of legal
personhood, we could simply forbid property rights in anything that
counts as a person, whether completely human or not: property rights in
an embryo would be fine perhaps, but property rights in a pig with a high
functioning human brain would perhaps not be acceptable.
But despite the existence of these dramatically different responses,
both fail to come to terms with the hard truth that all of this technology
confronts us with: it is not enough to decide the difficult question of who
is a person and then simply forbid property rights in that person. It takes
much more than giving persons' bodies a special, formal legal status of
"non-property" to sufficiently protect the physical well-being and inde-
pendence of those bodies.
H. WHAT THE PROPERTY VERSION OF BODILY INTEGRITY IS MISSING
DESCRIPTIVELY: PROPERTY IS NOT SOLE DOMINION
An alternate approach to the question of what bodily integrity might
mean views control over one's body as a property-like right, essential to
freedom or autonomy. In this camp are persons who believe that there is
61. Cf Bagley, supra note 2, at 506 (describing a patented method for producing human
organs from pigs).
62. See HUGHES, supra note 45, at 231 (proposing regulation to prevent this from happening).
63. See Bagley, supra note 2, at 473.
64. E.g., id. at 510 (quoting with approval Professor Leon Kass, a religiously-inspired bioe-
thicist and former chair of President George W. Bush's Council on Bioethics).
65. See id. at 496-97.
66. As an example of this approach, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office initially rejected a
patent application for a HuMouse because it "embraces a human being," arguing that the Thirteenth
Amendment would prohibit such a patent. Gregory R. Hagen & Sibastien A. Gittens, Patenting
Part-Human Chimeras, Transgenics and Stem Cells for Transplantation in the United States, Cana-
da, and Europe, 14 RIcH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 34, 49 (2008).
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a fundamental right to control over one's own body or its parts.6 7 This
theory would not only protect the body from unwanted intrusion, but also
would protect one's right to modify one's body, choose to accept or re-
ject medical treatment, and the like. However, autonomy includes the
autonomy to contract one's autonomy away. Thus, the strong version of
this view would require that commodification of the body be permitted,
not simply when it is good economic or social policy, but because to do
otherwise would interfere with fundamental rights to ownership of one's
own body. 68 Strong libertarians would see prohibitions on the commodi-
fication of human bodies as unjust impositions on autonomy, and a cohe-
rent application of this view would therefore seem to permit organ sell-
ing, prostitution, the sale of genetically prized embryos, or employer
preferences for "upgraded" workers.
69
But to the extent this view derives the right to commodify one's
body from a property right in one's own body,70 it relies on a descriptive-
ly impoverished view of property as "sole dominion" over an object. The
person with ownership of the property, on this view, has the right to use
it, exclude others, possess it, and alienate it.71 Because persons own their
own bodies, the implication is that they must have the right to sell use
and possessory rights in their body and its parts.
67. Though they are not libertarians, major proponents of the transhumanist movement, which
supports the use of technology to make humans "better than well," have cited this argument from
autonomy in support of permitting such technologies. HUGHES, supra note 45, at 207, 229 (arguing
that "[o]nly beings with personhood are exempt from being property, since we each own ourselves
and can't be alienated from ownership of ourselves," and noting, with approval, "disparate move-
ments, like transgender rights, working to radicalize our control over our own bodies"); Nick Bo-
strom, In Defense of Posthuman Dignity, 19 BIOETHICS 202, 210 (2005) ("A liberal democracy
should normally permit incursions into morphological and reproductive freedoms only in cases
where somebody is abusing these freedoms to harm another person."); cf Volokh, supra note 4, at
1835 (arguing for a right to sell and buy organs rooted in the right to self defense). See also Bonnie
Steinbock, Sperm as Property, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 57, 66 (1995) (arguing that "individual
autonomy should prevail, and sperm is correctly regarded as property that can be bequeathed by
will"); Mary Taylor Danforth, Current Topic in Law and Policy, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The
Patient's Right to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 179, 191-95 (1988) ("Th[e]
property-based notion of control over one's name or likeness should be extended to one's body parts.
The common law recognizes the individual's exclusive right to use what is inherently personal, and
nothing is more personal than one's own genetic material."); Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward the
Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34
UCLA L. REV. 207, 218 (1986) (arguing that "human tissue possesses characteristics that satisfy
many of the criteria for establishing rights in tangible property").
68. See sources cited supra note 67.
69. E.g., DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW 84-127 (1982) (arguing
that properly understood autonomy would lead to permission for prostitution); cf. RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 139 (3d ed. 1986) (suggesting that a market in babies could
benefit those who can bear children but do not want them and those who cannot bear children but
want them).
70. See sources cited supra note 67.
71. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2; see also Robert P. Bums, Blackstone's
Theory of the "Absolute" Rights of Property, 54 U. CiN. L. REV. 67, 69 (1985) (arguing that the
reading of Blackstone as promoting "absolute" property rights is overbroad, and that he believed
property was "'independent of civil institutions' only in the most theoretical sense").
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But descriptively, ownership does not entail sole dominion over
property. 72 Instead, property is best thought of as a "bundle of sticks,"
where the sticks are rights and responsibilities that can be disaggregated
from the bundle.73 Thus, for instance, the law of nuisance may prevent
me from using my property in a manner that pollutes the air and disturbs
my neighbor.74 Or, my neighbor may have an easement by necessity
across my property, requiring me to permit her to cross my property so
that her parcel is not landlocked. 75 She may have this right even as I re-
tain possession of and title to the property. The removal of these "sticks"
from my "bundle" of property rights is not generally considered a viola-
tion of any fundamental right to my property.76 That is why even the
common law of property includes rights such as the easement by necessi-
ty or the nuisance action.77
What I do with my property affects other people, and thus, the fact
that the body may be analogized to property does not exempt it from this
general principle which permits property regulation for the sake of social
welfare and efficiency. While extremely low levels of regulation, or even
no regulation, might in fact be the best way to achieve social welfare,
this social welfare debate over regulation has nothing to do with funda-
mental rights. For instance, if my body is like any other form of property,
whether the state should decriminalize prostitution would depend on
whether (1) the practice is inherently unsafe, (2) women are better off
overall when the practice is prohibited or when it is permitted, and (3)
72. See Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property,
118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1026-29 (2009) (contrasting the classic ownership model of property with
more modem relational models of property, such as a proposed stewardship model, that would be
more descriptively and normatively appropriate to recognizing cultural property claims); David
Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manu-
script at 25, on file with author) (describing the popular myth of property as dominion over things,
and contrasting it to the more accurate conception of property as a "system that structures social
relationships with resources").
73. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 742 (1917):
In opposition to the ideas embodied in the passages just given, it is submitted that instead
of there being a single right with a single correlative duty resting on all the persons
against whom the right avails, there are many separate and distinct rights, actual and po-
tential, each one of which has a correlative duty resting upon some one person.
74. See, e.g., Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 58a (1610) (finding the building of a pig sty too
close to a neighbor's house to violate the neighbor's fights).
75. See, e.g., Wilson v. Smith, 197 S.E.2d 23, 25 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973) ("A way of necessity
arises when one grants a parcel of land surrounded by his other land, or when the grantee has no
access to it except over the land retained by the grantor or land owned by a stranger.").
76. For instance, regulation that limits the use of property is not considered a "taking" in the
United States even if discrete segments of the property rights are essentially removed, such as ability
to exploit airspace above land. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978). Nor, for instance, has labor regulation been considered to violate fundamental substantive
due process rights to property or contract in the United States since 1937. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,49 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act).
77. See Wilson, 197 S.E.2d at 26; Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. at 58b.
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regulation would promote public health and safety better than criminali-
78zation.
One might respond to this descriptive point about the legitimacy of
property regulation by arguing that the body is a particularly special re-
pository of autonomy. On this view, the body is not like other forms of
property, and deserves to be protected by a kind of fundamental right to
sole dominion that other property does not entail. A strong proponent of
liberalism might go even further and argue that the state should not regu-
late traditional forms of property either: the state should not prohibit me
from being a prostitute or from chopping down my trees because both
are exercises of my autonomy. But as Part III will show, both of these
positions are normatively wrong.
III. WHY DIGNITY, AUTONOMY, AND CAPABILITY APPROACHES TO
RIGHTS IN THE BODY ARE NORMATIVELY WRONG
A. What's Normatively Wrong with Dignity
Many may feel that my descriptive critique of the dignitarian ap-
proach to bodily integrity is not enough reason to be against a dignitarian
right to bodily integrity. Maybe the fiction of a body with integrity that
cannot be intruded on is a good fiction-one that should be promoted as
much as possible. Perhaps we should be carving off the body from the
environment in which it exists. For example, some argue that it is a good
idea to resist technological advances that will blur the lines between bo-
dies and their environments even further, in order to ensure that people
continue to think of human bodies and life as sacred. Thus, perhaps we
should think of dignity as harmed more severely when the body has the
formal legal status of property than when it does not. Perhaps we really
should consider the person who sold her kidney to have suffered greater
dignitary harm than the person who sold the use of her hands to her em-
ployer until they were unusable. Or perhaps we really should consider a
prostitute to suffer greater dignitary harm than a person who, as a result
of poverty, puts his prosthetic arm up for sale on eBay.
In this section, I argue that attempts to resist technological advances
and maintain a rigid distinction between humans and property may lead
to less, not more, human and social flourishing. Technology that blurs
this line holds the potential to improve the lives of those who are sick,
injured, or disabled, or those who simply want to improve and modernize
their bodies.
I also critique the use of dignity as a justification for even more
nuanced rights in the body, ones that permit some forms of body com-
modification but not others. The reason is that dignity requires a univer-
78. See sources cited supra note 13.
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sal account of what is, essentially, a human, and what are the compo-
nents of human dignity. 79 Such universal accounts of what a dignified
life consists of are likely biased, and therefore carry with them the dan-
ger of becoming oppressive. This is not only a problem with using digni-
ty to promote a monolithic privacy like right to bodily integrity, it is also
a problem with using dignity to justify even more nuanced rights in the
body.
1. Pluralism
Many have an intuition that a right to control one's own body is
fundamental to human dignity, human flourishing, or liberty. 80 This con-
cept might support the right to protect the body from intrusion, but would
encompass no right to mutilate one's own body, to consent to euthanasia,
sell one's organs, or otherwise show "disrespect" for one's body. 8' The
notion that the body has special status is commonly held. For instance, a
Department of Health and Human Services task force, in issuing recom-
mendations on organ transplantation, once stated "society's moral values
militate against regarding the body as a commodity. 8 2 It went on to cite
a report from the Hastings Center that said:
The view that the body is intimately tied to our conceptions of per-
sonal identity, dignity, and self-worth is reflected in the unique status
accorded to the body within our legal tradition as something that
cannot and should not be bought or sold. Religious and secular atti-
79. One of the best accounts of this form, and from which we can learn a great deal, is Martha
Nussbaum's development and defense of a universal list of basic human capabilities. But her work
demonstrates that rigorous attempts to define universal dignitarian human capabilities or rights rely
on "intuition," which she acknowledges is subject to "distortion." Our intuitions about what is mini-
mally required for a life with dignity are subject to our own biases. For this reason, Nussbaum is
careful to describe the list as contingent and tentative, and also to allow for mechanisms of cultural
change that could help us revise the list, such as being able to imagine and reason. MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 83, 174-75
(2006).
80. E.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997) (clarifying that the fight to refuse medical
treatment rests in the right "to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching"); Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)
(recognizing the right to bodily integrity); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278
(1990) (recognizing "a general liberty interest in refusing medical treatment"); NUSSBAUM, supra
note 1, at 78 (including it within her list of capabilities); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1
(1980) (consolidating battery, mayhem, and assault into a single crime); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 13, 18, 21 (1965) (defining battery and assault).
81. E.g., Vacco, 521 U.S. at 808 ("By permitting everyone to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment while prohibiting anyone from assisting a suicide, New York law follows a longstanding and
rational distinction.").
82. Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 57, 59 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 96).
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tudes ... make it plain just how widespread is the ethical stance
maintaining that the body ought to have special moral standing.
83
Many other countries also forbid organ sales.84 But this view loses
its appeal quickly when we consider that what one community may find
to express a lack of self-respect, another community may find an ulti-
mately fulfilling and meaningful use of the body. Changing the shape
of one's genitals might seem to some "disrespectful" of the body with
which one is born, but for some transgender persons, it is a self-affirming
expression of self and identity. Having sex in exchange for money may
be experienced as degrading for some prostitutes, but can be a fulfilling
career for other prostitutes. For instance, some prostitutes defy the pre-
sumption that emotional connections cannot be made through commodi-
fied sex, by forming friendships with clients, or having "favorite"
clients.86 Which, if any, is most degrading-getting paid to have an ad-
vertisement tattooed on one's arm, getting paid to have sex, or getting
paid to give a massage? The answer will surely be culturally contingent.
Covering one's breasts or hair could be alternately understood as ex-
pressing shame or expressing self-respect. 87 In a pluralist society, digni-
tary concerns seem an inadequate justification for forbidding people
from commodifying their bodies-they rely on conceptions of human
nature or what constitutes a good life that are not universally or even
widely shared, such as religious or "intuitionist" conceptions.
One of the most famous proponents of this dignitarian approach,
Leon Kass, the chair of the President's Council on Bioethics from 2002-
2005, encourages us to listen to the "wisdom of repugnance" in criti-
quing certain practices as harmful to human dignity.88 Kass has lamented
not only the immorality of reproductive technologies, but also the offen-
siveness of licking ice cream cones in public.
89
83. Kevin W. Wildes, Libertarianism and Ownership of the Human Body, in OWNERSHIP OF
THE HUMAN BODY, supra note 37, at 143, 152 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 3, at 96).
84. E.g., Transplantation of Human Organs Act, No. 42 of 1994 (India); Human Tissue Gift
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 211 § 10 (Can.). See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG., HUMAN ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION: A REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF WHO, 1987-1991, at
15-26 (1991) (surveying and listing countries that ban organ sales and those that do not).
85. See Wildes, supra note 83, at 147 ("Much of the effort to regulate and constrain the use of
the human body is embedded in a moral language of 'sanctity', 'dignity', 'justice', 'integrity', and
'solidarity' that assumes particular moral commitments.").
86. Lucas, supra note 22, at 248, 252.
87. See FADWA EL GUINDI, VEIL: MODESTY, PRIVACY AND RESISTANCE 13 (1999) (discuss-
ing the evolution of differing views pertaining to veiling practices); cf. CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, THE
EDUCATION OF A WOMAN: THE LIFE OF GLORIA STEINEM, at xviii (1995) (describing Steinem's
"feminis[m] in a miniskirt" as a walking "contradiction").
88. Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1997, available
at http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/medicalethics/meOO6.html.
89. LEON R. KASS, THE HUNGRY SOUL: EATING AND THE PERFECTING OF OUR NATURE 148-
149 (1994):
Worst of all from this point of view are those more uncivilized forms of eating, like lick-
ing an ice cream cone-a catlike activity that has been made acceptable in informal
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Some members of this camp would permit modifications to the
body that do not entail the sale of the body, its parts, or uses, such as the
free donation of an organ to a sibling in need, or the creation of an ani-
mal-human hybrid over which nobody holds intellectual property
rights. 90 Others would object even to some of these modifications that
could not fairly be called "commodification"91 because they involve no
economic exchange. But what characterizes this camp is the argument
that the root of the right to bodily integrity is a dignitary one. Because
people disagree over the contours of dignity, what exactly constitutes an
offense against dignity varies widely, and this is why the group contains
both moral conservatives and liberals.
This debate over whether a change to or use of one's body is self-
respecting appears even when the change is widely thought of as a medi-
cal "improvement." For instance, obtaining a cochlear implant that per-
mits the user to hear might seem a thoroughly unobjectionable alteration
of one's body to many. But to some members of the deaf community, it
can represent a rejection of one's self, as well as one's community-a
selling out, if you will, to dominant norms of communication and lan-
guage.92 Thus, in a pluralistic society, we cannot rest our rights in the
body on what actions demonstrate respect for the body and what actions
do not. To do so would rigidly fix the definitions of what are appropriate
uses and forms of the body.
Moreover, hewing to convention on the appropriate use and forms
of the body will not only lead to stagnation, it lacks compassion. For
instance, in his 2006 State of the Union speech, former President George
W. Bush opposed animal-human hybrids as one of many technologies
that the religious right fears will blur the line between humans and the
rest of the world.9 3 Even more recently, in March of 2008, the Vatican
published a list of seven modern sins that includes genetic manipulation,
morally debatable experiments, and violation of the fundamental rights
of human nature.94 But what if animal-human hybrids or stem cell re-
America but that still offends those who know why eating in public is offensive. I fear
that I may by this remark lose the sympathy of many readers, people who will condes-
cendingly regard as quaint or even priggish the ... view that eating in the street is for
dogs.... This doglike feeding, if one must engage in it, ought to be kept from public
view, where, even if we feel no shame, others are compelled to witness our shameful be-
havior.
90. For instance, United States law permits voluntary organ donation while forbidding organ
sales. 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e(a) (West 2009).
91. See id.; see also sources cited supra note 19.
92. E.g., SOUND AND FURY (PBS 2000) (documenting a deaf child's wish to obtain a cochlear
implant in defiance of her deaf parents' wishes).
93. George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union
(Jan. 31, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current
&code=bushadmin&year-2006).
94. See sources cited supra note 19.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
search can be used to alleviate a patient's severe pain?95 Other grounds
for opposing these technologies may exist, but a conventionalist's argu-
ment from "the wisdom of repugnance 96 is a particularly uncompelling
basis in a pluralistic society. Similarly uncompelling is an argument
rooted in the desire to preserve categorical distinctions between persons
and property, without a theory of why such a distinction is so worthwhile
as to overcome the claims of persons who are physically suffering and
their families. Both the kidney seller, who could use compensation to
improve her life, and the kidney purchaser, whose health is dramatically
improved through transplantation, must be answered to.
97
2. Dignity of the Body as a Social Justice Concept?
Some argue, in contrast, that compassion actually requires this for-
malist distinction between people, who are afforded special status, and
property.98 On this view, we must hold the line between persons and
property fast, as a way of protecting persons with disabilities and other
biologically disfavored persons, who might otherwise be deemed not
worthwhile. The concern is that such persons would have their lives,
security, and other needs "balanced" against other interests, rather than
respected as inalienable and non-negotiable rights.99 Life as a person
with disabilities, an abnormal person, or even an average person who
refuses to bring his or her body into conformance with current cultural
norms, would become a "choice" that would not be protected. 100
For instance, some argue that treating embryos as mere property
could cause the destruction of lesbian and gay persons or persons with
disabilities through genetic selection of "straight embryos" or "able-
bodied embryos."'' ° The "gay embryos" or "disabled embryos" could
simply be destroyed, as one's property can be destroyed. Or perhaps the
"straight, able-bodied embryos" would command a higher price in the
95. Stem cell research is widely discussed for its potential to lead to the development of
treatments for diseases, and animal-human hybrids might be used to develop organs for transplanta-
tion into humans. See Bagley, supra note 2, at 472, 520.
96. See Kass, supra note 88.
97. E.g., Volokh, supra note 4, at 1835 (arguing that forbidding organ sales violates the right
to self defense of those who need organs).
98. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Body and the Quest for Control, in Is HUMAN NATURE
OBSOLETE?: GENETICS, BIOENGINEERING, AND THE FUTURE OF THE HUMAN CONDITION 155, 161
(Harold W. Baillie & Timothy K. Casey eds., 2005).
99. See, e.g., id. at 155-61.
100. id. at 161 (arguing that parents who chose not to abort children with Down's Syndrome
and other disabilities would be viewed as having made a choice to do so that society need not sup-
port).
101. See e.g., Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding for Change: The Power of the Human Genome to
Transform the American Health Insurance System, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 27 (2002) ("The very
phrase 'wrongful birth' suggests that the birth of the disabled child was wrong and should have been
prevented." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.w.2d 670, 688-
91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999))).
[Vol. 87:1
2009] AGAINST THE RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY 21
market than "gay embryos" or "disabled embryos," creating a significant
status harm for lesbian and gay persons and persons with disabilities.
0 2
In another example, some egalitarians argue that commodification
of the body could permit economic disparities to widen between those
who can afford financially valuable upgrades to their bodies and those
who cannot. 03 Perhaps an upgrade to the body would give a person more
abilities-such as strength or intelligence-that would be a great advan-
tage in the employment market. Those who could not afford such up-
grades would find it increasingly difficult to earn a good wage, once
forced to compete with those whose greater wealth, or whose parents'
greater wealth, afforded them the opportunity to buy into privately
owned body modifying technology.
Thus, some members of the dignitarian camp would forbid property
rights in embryos, in order to prevent perhaps their destruction and likely
their sale on the basis of their genetic content. Others might forbid em-
ployers from discriminating against those who fail to get certain up-
grades to their bodies.
The idea is that the special status of the natural human body must be
maintained to prevent some bodies from being worth less than other bo-
dies; otherwise our impulse is to require "natural" bodies to change, ra-
ther than changing the environment and society that is inhospitable to
them. In other words, our impulse to accommodate different bodies, es-
pecially those that are disabled, would be hindered. 104
However, intuitive ideas about what is natural and what is not do
not necessarily lead to protected bodies because aspects of our environ-
ment may feel intuitively natural. For instance, the existence of stairs in
many buildings and lack of wheelchair ramps may seem a natural, given
state of affairs. It took years of activism and scholarly writing by disa-
bility advocates to interrogate the medical model of disability and instead
promote the "social model" of disability, under which we can distinguish
between physical impairment and the social conditions, such as the use
of stairs rather than ramps, that turn an impairment into a disability. 0 5 As
102. Aside from ignoring that cultural pressure to perform a heterosexual identity is, and in
many cultures has been, enough to crush and subordinate lesbian, gay, and bisexual practice and
identity, this argument also fails to recognize that some persons would prefer to have gay children or
to be gay, and would choose those options. See generally Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How to Bring
Your Kids up Gay, 29 SOC. TEXT 18 (1991).
103. See HUGHES, supra note 45, at 130-31 (describing the Center for Genetics and Society's
argument that cloning and the creation of inheritable genetic modifications will lead to such a situa-
tion).
104. E.g., Elshtain, supra note 98, at 163 ("[S]urroundings in which bodies are situated fades
as the body gets enshrined as a kind of messianic project.").
105. See Corker & Shakespeare, supra note 42, at 3 (describing the shift from the medical
model of disability to the social model, in which activists raised awareness of the fact that impair-
ment alone does not cause disability, but rather social and economic conditions overlaying impair-
ment).
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another example, a person with a severe allergy to unprocessed nuts, or
to locally native plants, could easily be subject to a belief that his or her
body is improperly adapted to the "natural" environment, if we simply
rely on intuitive ideas about what is natural. And lesbian, gay, and bisex-
ual people have long been accused of having "unnatural" sexual desires
because same sex sexual activity does not "naturally" lead to reproduc-
tion. Thus, what sexual minorities do with their bodies is often left un-
protected by the appeal to intuitions about nature.
And indeed, it is not clear that in all cases changing the environment
is necessarily more compassionate than changing bodies. It may some-
times be better to alleviate suffering by changing what we have previous-
ly thought to be "the central core of our humanity,"'10 6 rather than by
changing the environment. A formalist approach that reveres the organic
body or listens to the "wisdom of repugnance" does not adequately allow
for this, and can therefore seriously harm the rights of those with differ-
ent bodies, too.
For instance, transgender persons who choose to obtain body mod-
ifying surgery or engage in body disguising dress practices are changing
their bodies, rather than the environment, both of which are probably
contributors to gender identity disorder ("GD"). 10 7 It is unclear why the
insistence that we change the environment, rather than permitting trans-
gender persons to change their bodies and clothing, is a superior response
to GID. This is especially so when we realize that awareness of and re-
spect for the bodies of transgender persons may contribute to positive
changes in the cultural environment. Transgender persons who obtain
body-modifying surgery or dress in a manner that obscures parts of the
body do not necessarily accommodate or reinstantiate social construc-
tions of gender-these practices can destabilize those constructions.'
0 8
Questioning gender constructions and stereotypes can then lead to
changes in the environment and social order, rather than stubborn refus-
als to change the environment in which our bodies exist.
As an example of where this desire to glorify and dignify the natural
body can lead, we can look to Jean Elshtain. Elshtain at times appears to
be a defender of those who are different, such as persons with disabilities
and sexual minorities, but she also expresses concern with a society that
might no longer feel disgust towards a human body "riddled with pieces
of metal."' 9 Yet, that body riddled with metal may be a person with dis-
abilities who, like all of us, is using the available technology to live the
106. Elshtain, supra note 100, at 167.
107. 1 use the term GID because it is a well-recognized term, not to express any agreement
with the medical characterization of many transgender persons as having a "disorder." See Dean
Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 19-21 (2003).
108. Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER 307, 313-14, 318 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
109. Elshtain, supra note 100, at 167.
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best life possible. Alternately, it might be a person who elects to have
numerous piercings as an important religious or identity related practice.
Revulsion towards such a body doesn't seem compassionate at all.
I believe the worth of different bodies, and the rights of persons
with different bodies, is better located in the public's interest in people
with different bodies as a means of facilitating cultural change, rather
than in a naturalist or intuitionist account of "what is a human." For in-
stance, we can value the bodies of persons with hearing impairments by
looking at the richness and beauty of sign language, rather than by valo-
rizing the "natural" state of the impairment and rejecting the wishes of
the deaf child who desires a cochlear implant. 10 This way of valuing
different bodies-based on their important place in cultural evolution-
might work better for persons with disabilities because it recognizes the
fact that people are constituted by and within technology. It is persons
with disabilities for whom this fact makes a great deal of material differ-
ence. In contrast, the naturalist approach might lead to less support for
welfare rights to technology that would assist persons with disabilities.
Why would a government-funded health care system pay for a cochlear
implant, or for a wheelchair, if deafness or inability to walk were revered
as "natural"?
The naturalist account is of course similarly dangerous for persons
with minority sexual identities. What is "naturally human" or "intuitive-
ly" beautiful or repulsive is always contested, and plenty of persons who
promote this formalist approach also promote the subordination of sexual
minorities and women."' If we reflect on how societies have historically
treated sexual minorities and persons with disabilities, the "wisdom of
repugnance" does not, in my view, seem to be the safest approach for
these groups.
Abandoning a naturalist or intuitive source of rights in favor of this
approach, geared at social and cultural change, need not mean that
people's bodies are only worth something when they have the capacity
for rational, political engagement. Instead, we can recognize that bodies
are sites of identity and cultural performance, and are therefore worth
something to others, even when they are mentally or otherwise disabled
in a way that makes traditional political participation impossible. People
can be loved, be part of society, and be part of our culture without being
110. In the documentary film Sound and Fury, a young child's deaf parents forbade her from
receiving a cochlear implant, after much debate with other members of the deaf community and both
hearing-impaired and non-hearing-impaired family members. They determined that the implant
would be a rejection of the rich and valuable deaf community they were a part of and that was often
discriminated against unjustly. SOUND AND FURY (PBS 2000). While views on the parents' decision
may vary, there is something tragic in the circumstances that led to the parents being unable to value
both the deaf community and their daughter's desire to experience what hearing is like.
Ill. E.g., Leon R. Kass, The End of Courtship (pt. 1), BOUNDLESS, Oct. 13, 2005,
http://www.boundless.org/2005/articles/a000I 154.cfm (arguing that women should be modest and
mothers).
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part of our politics. 112 Thus, we don't need an organic account of who is
naturally a human in order to value many different kinds of bodies. We
can recognize the importance of embodiment without revering the types
of embodiment we are used to, or responding with disgust to the types
that we are not.
B. What's Normatively Wrong with Autonomy
I have argued that the property-like approach to bodily integrity is
descriptively wrong about property-fundamental property rights are not
violated merely because they are heavily regulated. But as noted in Part
II, some might argue that normatively, we should protect either property
rights in the body or even all property rights against regulation, as a
component of autonomy. In this section, I argue against the use of auton-
omy as a basis for property-like fundamental rights in the body or any
other form of property that would trump typical political concerns such
as public health or even parentalism.
One might argue from an autonomy or personhood standpoint that
we should carve out a property-like right in our bodies, marked off by the
physical borders of the body. This right would be different from other
property rights in that it would be freer from restraints on alienation and
would truly serve as a trump of typical political concerns driving regula-
tion. The idea is that the body, more than property, is particularly funda-
mental to personhood or autonomy. "
3
But property, too, can be a crucial part of personhood and autono-
my, much more so than certain body parts. Margaret Radin, for instance,
has persuasively argued that certain forms of property are properly un-
derstood as personal in nature, such as wedding rings or houses.' 14 The
clothes I choose to wear may be a more important component of my per-
sonhood than my fingernails, as another example.
Regulation of property can even impact personhood via the body it-
self. This occurs whenever property is tied to the use and experience of
one's body. For instance, if the state forbids the sale of corsets, makeup,
and high heels, it infringes on the manner in which I make my body cul-
turally visible and the manner in which I physically experience my body.
The same is true when the state regulates sex toys and medical devices.
Food and drug regulation limits what we can ingest, and the Controlled
112. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP 96-106 (2006).
113. Cf Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 800 (1989) (arguing that
control of the body is "formative").
114. See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 20, at 959-61.
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Substances Act can determine whether someone's body exists in pain or
not.
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By arguing that the body is not a special repository of autonomy or
personhood, I do not deny that the body may have a special relationship
to autonomy, stemming from the cognitive force that being physically
controlled can have. It may be impossible in many circumstances to men-
tally "overcome" experiences like pain or physical restriction, and there-
fore control of another's body may amount to the destruction of that per-
son's autonomy'16 in a way that control of their property could not com-
pare. Torture has, for this reason, been described as "unmaking the
world" of the victim. 117 It is easy to see, with this in mind, why one con-
cerned with autonomy would argue that the government should not be
permitted to control the individual's body in a manner that is cognitively
overpowering, such as by forcing the individual to endure pain, requiring
the individual to experience pregnancy (or prohibiting the individual
from having such an experience), or prohibiting the individual's use of
psychoactive drugs.
But the claim that regulation of kidney sales, prostitution, manual
labor, and other forms of body commodification interferes particularly
egregiously with autonomy merely because these activities involve parts
or uses of the body would not be supported. An environmental regulation
that prevents me from chopping down trees on my land and selling them
is no less cognitively overpowering than a public health regulation that
prevents me from selling my kidney or engaging in prostitution. Even
though having a kidney removed or engaging in sex might have cogni-
tive effects that an individual desires and that cannot be duplicated in any
other way, a prohibition on engaging in these activities for money
doesn't prevent the individual from having those experiences at all: the
individual can still give the kidney away for free, or consent to sex for
free.
One might respond to this with the even stronger libertarian view
that all property rights should trump typical regulation, whether property
rights in the body or not. The problem with this view normatively is that
commodification itself, whether of the body or other material, is not en-
115. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 7 (2005) (noting, in the context of a case upholding the
Controlled Substance Act's prohibition on possession of marijuana as a valid exercise of Congress's
commerce clause authority, that plaintiff's "physician believes that forgoing cannabis treatments
would certainly cause [her] excruciating pain and could very well prove fatal").
116. Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 788-89:
Yet power need not be directed at the undeveloped mind to have this effect; it may also
do so if directed at the fully-developed body.... Indeed, bodily control may be the more
effective medium to the extent that thought cannot, as it were, meet such control head on,
as it might when confronted by an idea that it is told to accept.... [I]ts effect can befor-
mative, shaping identity at a point where intellectual resistance cannot meet it.
117. See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD
37-38 (1985).
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tirely unproblematic for autonomy, as choices can be coerced not only by
the state but also by private actors. If the state attempts to promote au-
tonomy by refraining from all regulation of what can and cannot be done
with the body altogether, those with private sources of power will be free
to interfere with the choices of others. When we live as members of a
society, our choices concerning our bodies will never be absolutely
"free," in the sense that they are uncoerced, uncontrolled, or undeter-
mined by others." 
8
For instance, when a person has a disability and obtains prosthetics
to assist with the disability, this is in part because the person's body has
been socially constructed as disabled. If we all used sign language to
communicate, fewer deaf persons would desire cochlear implants. In
another example, if we failed to classify persons on the basis of the shape
of their genitals, fewer transgender persons would desire genital surgery.
If actresses didn't receive massive sums of money for looking eternally
young, would so many of them "choose" to get injected with Botox?
Someone with a great deal of economic power can offer money to
an employee in exchange for the performance of a job, such as manual
labor, that eventually damages the employee's body. 19 Or, someone who
owns many buildings will, through her choices about whether to install
wheelchair ramps, influence the mobility of many persons with disabili-
ties. Markets that reward attractiveness can incentivize cosmetic sur-
gery. 120 Even the most typical forms of employment, such as waitressing
or bartending in a "uniform of makeup,"' 2 1 raise concerns about whether
selling control over one's body in this way is a choice made "freely."'
122
And does someone have sufficient autonomy if he desires a wheelchair
for basic mobility, but cannot afford one and is not provided one by his
society? 23 In other words, persons are unavoidably embodied in the con-
text of their environment, an environment largely made up of legal rela-
tionships of property and contract.
118. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 209-222
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at
770-81 (1976) (making this point with respect to sexuality and Citing Foucault's The History of
Sexuality).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
120. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
121. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 2004), affd, 444 F.3d
1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
122. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
123. See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, arts. IV, XX
U.N. Doc. AJRES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007) (stating obligations of parties to promote research into and
affordable access to aids for persons with disabilities, including mobility aids); cf Dean Spade,
Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 782-91 (2008) (documenting the double bind created
by, on the one hand, the exclusion of gender confirming medical care such as sex-reassignment
surgery or hormone therapy from Medicaid and other state funded health coverage, and, on the other
hand, state demands that transgender persons obtain such treatment in order to legitimize their status
and be appropriately gender classified).
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In critiquing the notion that inviolable private property-like rights
best promote autonomy, I am not advocating the eradication of private
property. That, too would threaten autonomy, since state coercion is no
less a form of coercion than economic coercion. Moreover, even without
economic and state coercion, social and cultural coercion remain. For
instance, one might obtain cosmetic surgery even in the absence of fi-
nancial incentives to do so because one desires an intimate relationship,
and cultural norms may prefer people with certain kinds of bodies. Or,
one may be pressured by family members to donate a kidney to a sibling.
Thus, there is no mechanism by which we can "maximize" autono-
my over the body. All we can do is make decisions about where to allo-
cate the coercive power that will inevitably influence individual choices
concerning the body.124 We might choose to allocate all that power in
totally unregulated private hands, through a strict libertarian "no state
action" doctrine. Or, we might choose to allocate that power in the hands
of those with cultural capital, while forbidding or limiting its exercise in
economic transactions. Thus, we might limit rights to contract away
one's control over one's body, while permitting families and other social
groups to coerce individuals into giving up that control. The problem
with the autonomy argument is that it doesn't help us choose from these
alternatives. We cannot compare all allocations for "levels of autonomy."
Some would even say that the notion of autonomy is itself essentially an
illusion for anyone who lives in a social context. 25 But even if we do not
take this strong a position in critiquing autonomy, it is still a poor basis
for a right in one's body that trumps typical regulation.
C. The Capability Approach-Combining Dignitary Approaches with
Liberal "Choice"
There are some essentially liberal justifications of human or funda-
mental rights that acknowledge the problem of private coercion. These
accounts therefore reject the libertarian approach in favor of one that
might require positive efforts to promote truer autonomy. In this section,
I consider and reject a strong example of such an account as an alternate
way of justifying human rights in the body.
Martha Nussbaum's capability approach, drawing on Amartya
Sen's capability approach to measuring welfare,126 uses an intuitive ap-
proach to reach a list of "capabilities" she argues are essential to human
dignity,12 7 and she includes bodily integrity in this list. 28 However, she
124. See FOUCAULT, supra note 118, at 194.
125. Id.; see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 159 (Robert Hurley trans.,
Pantheon Books 1978) (1976) ("The irony of this deployment is in having us believe that our 'libera-
tion' is in the balance.").
126. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 131-37 (1999).
127. NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 74-75.
128. Id. at 78.
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would not require one to maintain one's own bodily integrity, but would
only require, in a liberal way, that each person has the capability to do
so. 129 Moreover, she includes holding property on the list of capabili-
ties. 130 Thus, her approach to rights over one's body combines elements
of the traditional liberal autonomy idea with the intuitionist dignity
idea.
131
However, what distinguishes Nussbaum from a libertarian is that for
this capability to be provided to all, in the face of the problem of private
coercion and control described above, positive government action may
be necessary. As a result, the capability for bodily integrity will in many
cases need to come at the expense of some portion of the capability to
hold property or obtain employment. It wouldn't make sense to "trade
off' these two important and essential capabilities against each other,
under the approach, 32 but it is also true that not all the capabilities can
necessarily be maximized simultaneously. They are instead treated as
minimum thresholds-thresholds that incidentally do not appear to be
met for many of the world's citizens. Thus, one capability might be re-
duced in order to promote another, as long as one did not reduce the ca-
pability below the minimum threshold. This approach is intended to be
flexible, 133 which is part of why it is very coherent, as well as compas-
sionate and realistic in a way that neither the "wisdom of repugnance"
approach nor the libertarian approach is. However, the capabilities ap-
proach does not seem to help us answer the question of when freedom of
contract or property must be regulated in order to provide and promote
the capability for bodily integrity, and when it should not be. The pur-
pose simply doesn't seem to be to provide a principle for deciding that
question.
Moreover, the justification for regulating contract, property, and
other forms of individual choice stems, at bottom, from intuitions. Nuss-
baum's approach is self-consciously "intuitionist. ' 34 Thus, despite her
use of "capabilities," rather than fixed requirements for a life worth liv-
ing, this soft liberal approach still takes admittedly biased intuitions and
uses them universally 35 as a justification for regulating behavior. Nuss-
129. See id. at 87.
130. Id. at 80.
131. Id. at 91.
132. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 79, at 167.
133. Id. at 78-79:
I consider the list as open-ended and subject to ongoing revision and rethinking, in the
way that any society's account of its most fundamental entitlements is always subject to
supplementation (or deletion).
I also insist.., that the items ... be specified in a somewhat abstract and general way,
precisely in order to leave room for the activities of specifying and deliberating by citi-
zens and their legislatures and courts.
134. Id. at 174-75.
135. Id. at 78 ("The capabilities approach is fully universal .... The approach is in this way
similar to the international human rights approach .... "). It is important to note, though, that Nuss-
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baum is laudably cautious about all this, and indicates for this very rea-
son that the list of capabilities must be updated periodically, but the
strong risk of biased intuitions being used to justify oppressive regulation
still remains.
IV. WHAT THE BODY HAS TO DO WITH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Does all this critique mean that human rights have nothing to do
with bodies? Do rights have nothing to do with controversial questions
such as whether to permit prostitution, whether the state may force vac-
cination, or whether organ selling should be permitted? In other words,
should all these questions only be resolved on the basis of typical politi-
cal and welfare concerns, with no rights "trumping" those concerns?
Having critiqued the autonomy, dignity, and capability approaches to
resolving these questions, in this Part I propose a different ground for
rights in bodies. However, this justification would not support a right to
"bodily integrity," alienable or not.
A. Proceduralist Theories of Rights
Autonomy, dignity, and even compelling combinations of such con-
cepts are not the only reasons in which we can ground fundamental
rights. Rights can also be vehicles for promoting social and cultural
change-ways of helping us update our intuitions. Free speech rights, for
instance, have been promoted on this basis. 136 While laws, social norms,
and cultural values will always determine what choices are available to
us, 137 we can use rights as vehicles for ensuring that those norms can
change, and that their evolution is not determined solely by orthodoxy.' 
38
Such a conception of rights would promote speech rights, for instance,
on the proceduralist theory that this contributes to a democratic culture,
or even to a search for truth, 139 rather than on an autonomy theory. This
might lead to obligations that the government subsidize the speech of
those with less capital, or limit freedom of contract so as to protect em-
ployee and tenant speech as against the property rights of employers and
landlords.
baum does not argue that the universal nature of the list "license[s] intervention with the affairs of a
state that does not recognize them." Id. at 80. She states that "military and economic sanctions are
justified only in certain very grave circumstances." Id.
136. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
26 (1948) (arguing that access to unconstrained information and ideas is necessary to an informed
populace and the functioning of democracy).
137. See Kahan, supra note 14, at 115 (arguing that even when consciously justified in secular,
pluralist terms, laws will often be driven by the expression of cultural values and repression of
deviant moral values).
138. Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 18.
139. D.A. LLOYD THOMAS, IN DEFENCE OF LIBERALISM 36 (1988) ('The case for a liberal set
of individual rights does not rest on the assumption that we already know what is intrinsically valua-
ble. Rather, it rests on a plausible claim about how it is possible to have better formed beliefs about
what is valuable.").
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Of course, law cannot eradicate social norms, and we probably
wouldn't want it to. However, it is important that those norms be capable
of changing. In order for culture to be capable of change, individuals and
subcultures must be better empowered to challenge and contribute to the
construction of culture: some level of cultural velocity must be
present. 40
The goal of maintaining cultural velocity shares similarities with
Jack Balkin's thesis that in addition to a democratic political system, we
need a democratic culture.14 Protecting the ability of individuals to form
affiliations, beliefs, and values-to engage in making culture-is impor-
tant, I argue, not because those abilities are crucial to autonomy, but ra-
ther because those abilities contribute to cultural exchange and evolu-
tion. 
142
B. Cultural Velocity and Identity
What I add to this conception is the view that identity is a precursor
to cultural and political meaning making. I define identity as the particu-
lar values, beliefs, and aspects of ourselves that we deem so important
we consider them self-defining. "Our aversions, desires, beliefs, and
choices all make up our identity, but our identity in turn then affects our
aversions, desires, beliefs, and choices."' 143 "Even when an aspect of
identity seems 'unchosen,' such as a biological sex or an ethnicity, we
still choose, albeit sometimes within very strong and other times within
very weak constraints, whether that 'immutable' trait will be part of our
identity."' 44 Although those choices will always occur within constraints,
law can carve out some space for the exercise of agency in the construc-
tion of identity. In this way, identity can be self-defining in the good
sense of a set of values and practices that one holds dear (but neverthe-
less could be different), rather than self-defining in the bad sense of a set
of stereotypes about a group that are resistant to change. Why would we
140. The idea of cultural velocity as a ground for deriving countermajoritarian rights shares
similarities with a consequentialist argument made by David Lloyd Thomas in In Defence of Libe-
ralism. See id. Thomas defends liberalism on utilitarian grounds, but on a unique form of utilitarian-
ism that he calls "experimental" utilitarianism. He rejects traditional utilitarianism because it would
require defining what is of utility-what is good, or of value, and he argues that we do not know the
answer to that question. However, he argues that we can defend those liberal rights, which would
contribute to discovering what is of value, by permitting experiments, in a sense, in what should be
valued. Id. at 36-37.
In a future piece, I will more thoroughly explore the concept of cultural velocity as a
justification for human rights more generally. For purposes of this article, however, it is sufficient to
note that such a concept could explain or justify rights in bodies, but not rights over the "integrity"
of bodies.
141. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
142. See Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 31-33.
143. Id. at 32.
144. Id. For a similar conception of identity as "choice" rather than as "discovered" fact, see
AMARTYA SEN, THE ARGUMENTATIVE INDIAN: WRITINGS ON INDIAN HISTORY, CULTURE AND
IDENTITY 350-52 (2005).
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want to promote diversity and reformability of identity? Because identity
is determined in part by cultural norms, but it is also a ground from
which to rally for changing those norms.
145
We cannot ensure total "freedom of identity" or "freedom of per-
sonhood" for the same reasons we cannot maximize "autonomy." Such
freedom is to some extent an illusion, given that even our physical bodies
are constructed in part by their social context. Our choices are heavily
constrained. But in the face of those constraints, we often see resistance.
Sexual minorities, racial minorities, disability activists, and those ex-
cluded from aristocracy and nobility are just a few examples of persons
who have engaged in culture wars, perhaps not securing themselves "li-
beration, " 46 but certainly moving culture in radical ways. This is one of
the reasons often given for protecting speech rights-such rights facili-
tate that cultural and political change.
What is often neglected, though, is that resistance to current cultural
norms need not take the form of traditional political activism, speech,
and interest group formation. Certain identity practices, such as dress,
sexual practice, speech, mannerism, body modification, and the like, can
themselves be subversive, destabilizing acts that have cultural effects. 147
Judith Butler has described drag as such a practice, calling it "gender
insubordination." 48 These culturally disrupting, identity disrupting prac-
tices have been valorized by postmodernists and queer theorists, though
their work to do so has often seemed too "academic," not having any
practical import. 149 Part of what makes this celebration of subversion
seem pointless is that the prescription to disrupt identity or subvert cul-
tural norms has limited use for someone who will lose her job, be kicked
out of school, or sent to jail for doing so. 150 That is where legal rights
come into play. Law can carve out some space for individuals, subcul-
tures, families, and other groups to form different, challenging identities,
and even reform them, yet still have a job, shelter, and other needs met
that would permit participation with the broader culture. In this way,
rights can be used to ensure that some level of cultural velocity is main-
tained.
145. Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 93.
146. See FOUCAULT, supra note 118, at 289.
147. Cf Judith Butler, "Appearances Aside, " 88 CAL. L. REV. 55, 63 (2000).
148. See Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 22 (citing Butler, supra note 108, at 307).
149. As Seidman has explained in an illuminating history of queer theory's development, "[tjo
the extent ... that poststructuralist perspectives ... [has become] a politics of the disruptive gesture,
they lack coherence." STEVEN SEIDMAN, DIFFERENCE TROUBLES: QUEERING SOCIAL THEORY AND
SEXUAL POLITICS 136 (1997). As he has also noted, "Underlying this politics of subversion is a
vague notion that this will encourage new, affirmative forms of personal and social life, although
poststructuralists are reluctant to name their social vision." Id. at 134.
150. See Butler, supra note 147, at 6 3:
For this challenge to take place, it must be possible for a person whose appearance calls
the category of the person into question to enter into the field of appearance precisely as a
person.... [A] power that is 'had' to the extent that such a person is not first defeated by
the powers of discrimination.
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C. Applying Proceduralist Rights in Practice
Of course, many behaviors are a part of identity formation and re-
formation. Dressing a particular way is part of identity formation and
reformation, but so is smoking, reading certain magazines, speaking in
particular dialects, and so on. Law cannot protect the freedom to en-
gage in all such behaviors, especially if we want law to protect these
behaviors not just against the state, but to also positively regulate em-
ployers, landlords, and other private actors who would use their econom-
ic power to direct these behaviors. Thus, although the proceduralist prin-
ciple of promoting cultural velocity represents a non-intuitionist, conse-
quentialist ground for recognizing certain rights, a practical application
of this principle to create actual legal rights must depend on cultural con-
text.152 We will have to choose some identity formative behaviors to pro-tect legally.
In many societies, freedom of speech will be a sensible fight to
carve out as a means of promoting cultural velocity. I have argued that
freedom of dress in the United States is also a sensible right to carve out,
in part because of the unique way in which dress is experienced as both
social and deeply personal, experiences that are historically and cultural-
ly contingent.1 53 I argued that it even ought to be protected to some de-
gree against private regulation, such as in the workplace. How that pro-
tection could be functional in the context of American capitalism of
course also required attention to the cultural and political context. Thus,
a relatively weak "reasonable accommodation" framework was what I
proposed. 154 But in a society in which physical appearance is not a par-
ticularly common site of identity exploration and formation, a site that is
frequently experienced as uniquely personal or physical in nature, for
example, it might not make sense to recognize a freedom of dress. Or, in
particular professions, such as modeling and acting, it might also not
make sense to recognize a freedom of dress.
55
Once rights that promote cultural velocity are fleshed out in this
way, with an eye to the particular context, one might question how this
differs from many modem forms of liberalism, such as Martha Nuss-
151. See Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 25, 33.
152. Cf. Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1078 (2007).
Riley has argued that good governance need not look like liberal democracy in every cultural con-
text, but has still articulated some core components of good governance that are broadly applicable
to many sovereigns, such as the ability to dissent and the ability to exit. Id. at 1061-80. The cultural
velocity principle would likely result, in virtually every society it were applied to, in protection of
the formal ability to dissent and to exit. I believe, however, that these formal abilities would rarely
be quite enough to ensure a significant amount of cultural velocity-the amount required to ensure
that a culture can evolve and meet new challenges. Room to develop the kinds of different identities
and affiliations that lead to the desire to dissent and exit is required, in my view.
153. See Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 25.
154. Id. at 61.
155. In fact, I proposed a categorical statutory exception for these professions. Id. at 63.
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baum's intuitionist concept of capabilities. Her approach also varies
based on the particular context, and it includes capacities for mental and
social development that might produce very similar results to the cultural
velocity approach's concern with identity formation and reformation.
56
One might argue that by using culturally contingent facts, such as the
importance of appearance manipulation to identity formation in the Unit-
ed States, I have imported what amounts to an intuitionist approach
through the back door.
The important difference is the grounds from which I draw the need
to protect identity formation. I draw not from intuitionist or dignitarian
grounds, nor from an autonomy ground, but from the consequentialist
ground that cultural velocity is of procedural value in all cultures because
it helps secure the ability to adapt, whatever one's view of a good life is.
This means that claims about what will best promote cultural velocity are
empirically falsifiable. If I argue for a legal protection of dress in the
form of a right based on the culturally contingent fact that dress is an
important site of identity formation, and dress loses this cultural salience,
I would have to change my conclusion. 57 If it turns out that protecting
dress in the form of a right hinders, rather than promotes, cultural veloci-
ty, I would also have to change my conclusion. What rights we protect
through an application of the cultural velocity approach will therefore
change when cultural facts change, when scientific understandings
change, and when technological advancements change.
Intuition, on the other hand, is by definition slow to change. Intui-
tions might be formed through repeated observations of the world, 58 or
through a complex set of cultural meanings,' 59 or both. But however they
are formed, intuitions are by definition those beliefs that have become
"immediate," and involve "knowing or sensing without the use of ration-
al processes.',' 60 They are therefore resistant to challenges from empirical
evidence.'
6 1
156. NuSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 78-79 (including "senses, imagination, and thought" on the
list of capabilities, as well as "practical reason").
157. In fact, it is entirely within the realm of possibility that I will be forced to change my
conclusion about freedom of dress within my lifetime. Because working from home is becoming
more and more common, people are spending less time interacting with each other visually, and
more time online. If this trend develops dramatically, the importance of dress both as a means of
forming an identity, and as an impetus of cultural velocity, might diminish in the future.
158. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998) (describing the use of mental heuristics as
an example of bounded rationality).
159. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1508 (2005) (describing
racial schemas, or meanings, as developing not merely in response to data perceived by one who
adopts the schema, but also growing out of complicated cultural meanings).
160. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 919 (4th ed. 2000).
161. See Jolls et al., supra note 158, at 1477-78; Kang, supra note 159, at 1508.
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D. Cultural Velocity and the Body
A cultural velocity approach seeks to protect diverse formations of
identity, but of course many behaviors are related to identity formation.
No society can protect all in the form of a legal right. We will have to
protect those areas of behavior which are most commonly culturally
meaningful, or which are unique in other ways that make them conve-
nient to carve off from other behaviors in the form of a right. Do reasons
such as this exist to carve off legal rights protecting control over one's
body?
1. The Body Is Political
The body is the site of our coming into being socially, and in the
United States, as well as in many societies, appears to be a particularly
common site of identity exploration, performance, and formation. I am
not arguing that the body is socially or culturally important in any "natu-
ral" or "essential" way. The argument here is decidedly not an argument
that treats the body as sacred, natural, and immutable. 62 Nor is it an ar-
gument that treats the body as distinct from and unaffected by the exter-
nal world and culture.
Indeed, I am positing that the body is not sacred, is deeply alterable,
and that "natural" and "unalterable" attributes of our bodies-such as the
color of our skin, the shape of our genitals, the color of our eyes, and the
texture of our hairs-may be no more important to many of us than "ar-
tificial" and "alterable" aspects of our bodies, such as our tattoos, pierc-
ings, jewelry, clothing, dyed hair, braided hair, hip implants, or canes.
t63
Rather than treating the body as a temple, I am recognizing its ines-
capable role-however historically, culturally, or politically contin-
gent-in our experience of self. I recognize that the body may hold no
more inherent, acontextual value than chattel. This is precisely why I
argue that we should not create a "right in the body" that rests on a for-
mal separation between persons and property, privileging outdated con-
structions of a biological or "natural" body.
On the other hand, the body's manipulation and alteration as an
identity formative practice has become widespread. The body and the
world around it have begun to bleed into each other: extreme body mod-
162. See Shell, supra note 3, at 333-34, 345-47 (discussing Kant's "concept of human dignity"
and bioethics in stem cell research).
163. In fact, the distinction between the natural or immutable and the artificial or choice-based
aspects of our bodies is a slippery one. Skin color, genital shape, eye color, and hair texture are all
alterable, with varying levels of effort. Body weight is alterable, but sometimes only with great effort
and social support. Tattoos are close to unremovable. Hip implants are removable, but only at great
medical cost to those who have them, and once implanted, they are internal to the owner. Are scars
from accidents "natural," or "artificial"? What about scars that are deliberately obtained as a form of
cosmetic body modification? Scars that result from surgery? Does it matter if the surgery was de-
fined as "elective" or "medically necessary"? Whose definition for those categories should we use?
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ification is on a more visible rise, clothes and other objects seem more
and more like parts of our bodies and extensions of ourselves, transsex-
ual persons' alterations of their gender are more and more visible, some
Asian Americans have opted for eyelid surgery, and Michael Jackson is
widely thought to have changed his skin color. And yet, all these trends
don't seem to represent a rejection of the body as having any importance
at all. These are not even trends toward the soul and mind taking prece-
dence over the body. If transsexual identity were about transcending the
importance of genital shapes, then why would so many transsexuals en-
dure the oppression they endure, spend the money they spend, and enter
into complicated relationships with the medical establishment to change
that which doesn't matter-the shape of one's genitals? Rather, these
manipulations, alterations, adornments, and extensions of our bodies
themselves carry a great deal of meaning to most of the people engaged
in them.
164
This need not be the case in some science fiction world of the fu-
ture, and it need not be universal. However, the fact that the meaning of
these body manipulations is contingent on a social and cultural context
makes them no less foundational a component of identity. It does, how-
ever, raise the question of whether the natural body actually makes sense
as a repository of special legal status. If we are accounting for the fre-
quency with which the body appears to play some especially important
role in identity formative practices, mapping the borders of a legal right
precisely onto the physical borders of the "natural," human body does
not make sense; for it is often "artificial" and "elective" manipulations
and adornments to the body that are identity performative.
There are many activities that are commonly experienced in terms
of their physicality, activities which are experienced as manipulations of
the body, but which do not involve alteration of the natural, biological,
integrated body. For instance, American feminists who argued for the
right of women to wear "sensible clothes," at the same time they argued
for the rights of women to vote and have jobs, did so not just because the
clothes that women were coerced to wear held a political meaning that
subordinated women, but also because the clothes were physically re-
strictive. Skirts and petticoats were experienced as a physical restraint on
women. 165 On the other hand, those who militate for freedom of speech
have rarely done so in terms of the right to control the air coming in and
out of their lungs and the movements they make with their mouths, de-
164. Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 39.
165. See KARLYNE ANSPACH, THE WHY OF FASHION 329-30 (1967) (describing the Bloomer-
ism movement to replace skirts with pants); CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, The Force Called Fa-
shion, in THE DRESS OF WOMEN: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMBOLISM AND SOCIOLOGY
OF CLOTHING 107, 116-17, (Michael R. Hill & Mary Jo Deegan eds., 2002); CHARLOTTE PERKINS
GILMAN, Hope and Comfort, in THE DRESS OF WOMEN, supra, at 131, 133-41 (discussing the op-
pressive nature of fashion).
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spite the fact that these behaviors arguably involve the body more inti-
mately in a physical sense, by making use of its internal organs.
Similarly, contracting oneself out for arduous physical labor is often
experienced as contracting out one's physical self, while contracting one-
self out as a professor-while involving physical activity such as stand-
ing and talking-is rarely experienced in this manner.166 ff the reason we
should protect rights in our bodies stems from their especially important
role in identity formation, in contributing to cultural velocity, then we
should focus in particular on those uses of the body which, as a cultural
and social matter, are actually experienced as bodily practices of identity
formation or reformation.
2. The Body is Personal
As the previous section reminded us, the importance of the body as
a site of identity experimentation in many societies cannot be overstated.
Many persons consider the ways in which they fashion, adorn, and mani-
pulate or modify their bodies (or refuse to do all these things) to be ex-
tremely important to their identity and sense of self. The relationship of
these behaviors to physical experience is part of what makes them unique
among all sorts of identity performative behaviors.
This uniqueness may make many of these behaviors good candi-
dates for special legal protection. Because not all identity performative
behaviors can be singled out, it may make sense for us to at least include
those which have the unique aspect of being experienced by many as
both personal and political, straddling the line between our separation
from and connection to others. But is there any reason to single out the
human body per se, as opposed to some of its extensions, such as cloth-
ing and perhaps other chattel, from other arenas of identity exploration?
In this section, I consider whether the fact that we have embodied subjec-
tivities 67 provides such a reason.
Embodied subjectivity describes the notion that we are not cogni-
tively separate from our bodies, that we are not minds or souls simply
"inhabiting" or "inside" a physical body. We experience the world not as
consciousnesses separate from and encapsulated within a body, but rather
through our bodies.'
68
For instance, what if I purchased artificial eyes to improve my vi-
sion, but those artificial eyes contained a filter, blocking me from seeing
images that were deemed to undermine the interests of the company that
sold me the eyes? This physical change would alter my subjectivity it-
166. See Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 693-94 (pointing out that professorial labor, like prosti-
tution, involves contracting out the body).
167. See, e.g., MARGARET A. McLAREN, FEMtNISM, FOUCAULT, AND EMBODIED
SUBJECTIVITY 2-3, 14, 83-91 (2002).
168. See, e.g., id. at 83-84.
[Vol. 87:1
2009] AGAINST THE RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY 37
self-my perception and experience of the world. The power to force or
even encourage most persons to implant such a filter would be a great
power indeed.
The concept of embodied subjectivity shares something with the
view that, "rather than speaking of rights in our bodies[,] it would be
more appropriate to say that for Hegel we have rights through our bodies
... an assault on one's body is not experienced as damage to one's prop-
erty but rather as direct injury to one's self as a person."'
' 69
Indeed, our brains and nervous systems, which in modern times we
often imagine to be our "consciousnesses," are part of our bodies, and
thoroughly embedded in our bodies. Nobody has yet succeeded in trans-
ferring the contents of a person's consciousness to a location outside the
person's body. There is currently no way to "upload" your brain to a
computer. Even if there were, it is unclear if the computer's inability to
taste, touch, smell, and see would proceed to alter the consciousness in
some significant way. 170 Another way to put this "is that all cognitive
experience involves the knower in a personal way, rooted in his biologi-
cal structure.' ' 71 "We have a subjective experience of our own thought
processes, but at best only an imagined representation of what goes on in
others' subjective experience."
172
The concept of embodied subjectivity implies that if I change my
body, I change the structure through which I perceive and experience-I
change my subjectivity. Were we to consider only this, we might pro-
mote a human right in the body that maps directly onto the physical, hu-
man body. Jed Rubenfeld, for instance, has argued that bodily control
should be part of the fundamental right to privacy because it may be a
particularly effective way for the state to influence subjects at the "for-
mative" level.
173
169. Uffe J. Jensen, Property, Rights, and the Body: The Danish Context-A Democratic
Ethics or Recourse to Abstract Right?, in OWNERSHIP OF THE HUMAN BODY, supra note 37, at 173,
180-81 (alteration in original) (quoting HARRY BROD, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS 69
(1992)).
170. This is not to say that the uploaded consciousness's difference from us would mean it
should be treated differently. That question goes to whether legal personhood should be granted to
so-called artificial intelligences. See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhoodfor Artificial Intelli-
gences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1231-32 (1992) (exploring this question). The point is simply that
current persons have embodied subjectivities, and we should therefore consider those embodied
subjectivities when we think about what rights to grant persons, and how best to fulfill them. It may
be that disembodied subjectivities wouldn't need the same rights that embodied subjectivities have.
This potentially unequal treatment should not trouble us, as this would simply be a case of treating
unlike persons differently, rather than treating like persons differently.
171. HUMBERTO R. MATURANA & FRANCISCO J. VARELA, THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE: THE
BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 18 (rev. ed. 1998).
172. TERRENCE W. DEACON, THE SYMBOLIC SPECIES: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND
THE BRAIN 424 (1997).
173. Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 800-01.
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Imagine that we could have filters implanted into our eyes. What if
a filter were created that made it impossible for the recipient to see im-
ages deemed dangerous to the government, and the government forced us
all to have the filters implanted? In contrast, imagine that the state forces
us all to paint our houses in the colors of the incumbent political party.
We might propose that because we have embodied subjectivities, there is
a good reason to be even more frightened of the former state than the
latter. If the state can control how its citizens perceive the world, this
creates, we might say, a much greater danger of cultural stagnation than
if the state can control whether citizens demonstrate support for the gov-
ernment. At least in the latter case, the citizens could reappropriate the
incumbent party's colors for some subversive purpose, or could perhaps
shift their dissent to other arenas, like dress or speech.
In other words, the idea of embodied subjectivity might provide a
factual, scientifically verifiable reason to distinguish between the body
and "personhood property" like wedding rings or houses-a reason to
create "privacy" rights in the body. However, we should not forget that
the body is not only personal, due to its important role in our subjective
experience; it is also generally political, because it is often the site at
which we take on a social form. Thus, some uses of and changes to the
body will be more important to the formation and exploration of identity
than others, despite the fact that subjectivity is embodied. Moreover,
some changes to and uses of the body are commonly experienced in
terms of their physicality, such as appearance manipulation, and others
are not, such as speech. This is largely a product of social circumstance.
Finally, and most importantly, even the subjective, lived experience of
the body is inevitably determined in part by social circumstances and
coercion. The law cannot protect embodied subjectivity by carving off
the human body because even this does not make it fully secure from
state and private coercion.
Suppose, for instance, that a technological improvement were in-
vented that provided purchasers with additional sixth--or even tenth-
"senses." In fact, implants have already been created that would permit
the recipient to sense electromagnetic fields. 174 Implants of this sort are
property. They are clearly not part of the organic, human body. But the
power of the implant seller to retain certain property rights in the implant
may become a power to influence the subjectivity of the implant reci-
pient. Such a power is inevitable in a world in which the body and prop-
erty exist in relation to each other, in which they bleed into each other.
In other words, if there is a "body" that human rights or constitu-
tional law ought to be protecting, it is not the "human body," as defined
174. Quinn Norton, A Sixth Sense for a Wired World, WIRED.COM, June 7, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/gadgets/mods/news/2006/06f71087.
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to mean an organic, physically continuous being distinct and isolated
from the surrounding world, but rather the "posthuman body," defined as
constructed by and situated within a social and technological context.
175
Protecting this "posthuman body" can't be done by carving it off for spe-
cial legal status because it can't be carved off at all. Thus, it must be pro-
tected through a combination of negative rights against the state and pos-
itive regulation of property and contract. Under this view, we should no
longer recognize a fundamental right to "bodily integrity," and funda-
mental rights should abandon the concern with commodification of hu-
man bodies per se. However, we should choose rights to protect-both
as negative rights and through positive regulation-with a recognition
that various uses of and changes to the body are especially important to
the formation of diverse identities, and therefore, to the goal of cultural
evolution.
In sum, the body is indeed a unique arena of identity reformation
because of facts about embodied subjectivity-a subjectivity that is al-
ways influenced by the world around the body-and because of facts
about the body as an extremely common site of cultural, political, and
social identity performance.176 This provides a fair reason in many socie-
ties to give special legal attention to identity development and formation
that is related to the body. But it does not provide a sensible reason to
create a legal right that maps neatly onto the natural, human body. In the
next section, I outline what factors we would appropriately consider,
from the cultural velocity perspective, when deciding what kinds of
coercion over the body should be carved out for special legal attention.
3. Protecting Bodies from Control
Due to the embodied nature of subjectivity, control of a person's
body may in fact become control of that person's very subjectivity, di-
recting the identity, thoughts, and beliefs of the person being controlled.
But our fear of this result may not be substantiated in every instance in
which the body is commodified, even when this occurs in a context of
coercion. 177 For instance, when blood is removed from the body, sensory
experience and inputs do not appear to change dramatically in the long
term. When someone engages in sexual activity, future experiences may
be altered significantly, but the change might be a positive one, rather
than a negative one.1
8
175. See generally PEPPER ELL, The Posthuman Manifesto, supra note 51.
176. It may even be the fact that subjectivities are embodied that has partially led to the fre-
quency with which cultures treat the body as a primary site of identity expression, formation, and re-
formation.
177. See Stephen R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 36, 46-52 (2001) (distinguishing between coercion, exploitation,
the use of power, and coercion as a neutral term and a negative term).
178. Of course, if the sexual activity results in pregnancy, these changes to the biological
structure are probably severe enough to dramatically change the subjective experience of the person,
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Sometimes a bodily intrusion or invasion carries with it a destruc-
tive social or cultural meaning that one is subordinate or one's identity
worthless. Rape has been described in this manner, for instance. Socially
and culturally, bodily invasion and control by another is often expe-
rienced as a loss of control over one's identity. On the other hand, those
who consent to sexual intercourse are not thought to generally experience
a loss of self-worth or identity in the way that some rape victims may.
We can ask ourselves in these varied situations, in what way does the
right to refuse or consent to bodily intrusion and invasion promote the
possibility of new and creative exercises of agency in the formation of
identity?
An interest of countermajoritarian constitutional or human rights
law in individuals' control over their own bodies is the interest in what
that control promotes-the capacity for social change as security against
stagnation. This explains why we might intrude on the libertarian auton-
omy to contract away control of the body where it better promotes that
public interest. Just as state control of bodies might get in the way of
bodies being used to explore and reform cultural identity, too much pri-
vate control of bodies might, too.
We may legitimately fear that an individual will become unable to
form their own opinions, thoughts, make their own decisions, and con-
sider a wide variety of cultural affiliations if another controls their body,
even if they consented to that control. Thus, there is something sensible
underlying the concern many have with transfers of rights in the body,
once we conceive of those rights as connected to cultural and political
expression and identity development, rather than merely zones of auton-
omy. Since subjectivity is embodied and bodies are so important cultu-
rally, those transfers may threaten our interest in dispersed, rather than
consolidated, control of the formation of subjects and identities. If the
formation of subjects is left to the control of the market, we may see so-
cieties as static as those in which the formation of subjects is rigidly con-
trolled by the state.
If we cared only about autonomy, we would leave persons to suffer
the consequences of their choices. That is what it means to have a choice.
And if we cared only about a static notion of respect for the natural body,
we would often refuse to permit persons to modify their own bodies. But
if we also care about freedom of thought, affiliation, and cultural produc-
tion because it is good for society, then we might want to prohibit some-
one from entering into contracts that will inhibit those freedoms, in order
to prevent those with greater capital from obtaining a monopoly on these
crucial contributors to social, political, and cultural change. The goal of a
even aside from changes in the way the person is treated socially. Thus, we might want to do our
best to ensure pregnancy is a state entered into with some forethought.
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society not overly constrained by orthodoxy may require that we forbid
persons from entering into too many self-constraints, but would still re-
quire respect for most of the choices persons make.
However, getting rid of all social coercion over our bodies is im-
possible. The relevance of our bodies is largely within a social context.
When a property owner places stairs at the front of a building, she makes
the bodies of those persons who cannot climb stairs relevant to their ex-
perience of the world in a way it would not be had she made the entrance
level with the sidewalk. When an employer requires his cocktail wai-
tresses to wear three-inch heels at work, he has not required them, at
least in the short term, to modify their natural bodies, 79 but he has
changed the way it feels when his employees walk, stand, or even sit.
Even "the use of tools and artifacts," such as at work, "requires a degree
of incorporation into the body; . . . the 'labor of animation."' 180 And
these uses of the body have lasting effects. For instance, despite the fact
that Henry Ford believed that repetitive labor would not "injure[] a man
in any way," such injuries do result. (Ford admitted having been told "by
parlour experts that repetitive labour is soul-as well as body-
destroying, but that has not been the result of our investigations," he ar-
gued.) 181
Not only is all this private coercion inevitable, human flourishing is
possible within the context of all this coercion, and is even facilitated by
the existence of private repositories of power. For instance, although
capitalism is a system that places a great deal of coercive power in pri-
vate hands, capitalism can provide the freedom to deviate from social
and cultural norms that contributes to the creation of new subcultures.
These subcultures can then challenge the very norms from which they
deviate. For instance, capitalism opened up a venue for the flourishing of
queer culture,' 82 and gay men and lesbians have found a refuge in com-
mercial venues such as bars and certain sectors of the entertainment in-
dustry.
Similarly, although it would seem that the choice to have sex in ex-
change for money is always, in some sense, coerced by the need or desire
for that money, this commodified sexual activity is not necessarily less
fulfilling or more corrupted than sexual activity arising out of "love" or
other impulses. For instance, in the work of some pro-sex feminists,
prostitutes have reported emotional connections and even having "favo-
179. Although in the long term he may have caused them lasting injury.
180. Jain, supra note 38, at 32 (quoting Elaine Scarry, The Merging of Bodies and Artifacts in
the Social Contract, in CULTURE ON THE BRINK 85, 97 (Gretchen Bender & Timothy Druckery eds.,
1994)).
181. Id. at 34 (quoting HENRY FORD WITH SAMUEL CROWTHER, MY LIFE AND WORK 105
(Doubleday, Page & Co. 1923) (1922)).
182. See John D'Emilio, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER, supra note 108, at 467,473-75.
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rite" clients. 83 These positive stories of prostitution can in turn challenge
our conceptions of what sexual activity should be and what role it should
play in our lives.
Finally, proponents of cultural property rights for indigenous and
other groups, in response to arguments that these rights would "commo-
dify" important elements of a culture, have demonstrated how this com-
modification need not be destructive to a subordinated subculture, and
can be used for progressive ends.'
84
In other words, we should acknowledge that human flourishing can
occur in the context of economic transactions, and can even be facilitated
by it.'85 In the context of the First Amendment, the United States Su-
preme Court has already recognized this, holding that forbidding profit
from speech is an unconstitutional restriction of speech.186 Thus, a feder-
al law that prevented civil servants from being paid for speeches and
writings has been struck down as overly restrictive of speech.1 87 Similar-
ly, one of New York's "Son of Sam" laws was struck down as overly
restrictive of speech. The law required convicted criminals profiting from
their crimes through books and movie deals to donate the profits to a
victim compensation fund. 88 These holdings acknowledge that banning
the commodification of a practice, or banning profits from the practice,
does not in the context of a generally capitalist economic system "pro-
tect" the practice in any sense. Rather, it discourages the practice.
On the other hand, the sometimes deleterious effects of capital on
these explorations of and articulations of identity cannot be ignored ei-
ther. The most visible forms of gay culture have displayed a tendency to
idolize the white and the wealthy.' 89 And positive stories of prostitutes
documented by pro-sex feminists aside, there are plenty of stories of
prostitution experienced as exploitative, denigrating, misogynist, and
183. Lucas, supra note 22, at 252.
184. See Carpenter et al., supra note 72, at 1026-30; Madhavi Sunder, Property in Person-
hood, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 22, at 164, 171 ("[Tlhere may, in fact, be
some room for property in personhood claims if they are grounded on more modem understandings
of both culture and property.").
185. See Carol M. Rose, Afterword: Whither Commodification?, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION, supra note 22, at 402, 404 ("Markets seem inappropriate for some things, but
then again, maybe markets are pretty useful for exactly the same things."). Rose also discusses the
"market's possibilities for novelty, liberty, and self-fashioning-not to speak of money." Id. at 421.
186. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761-62 (1976) (concluding that speech which proposes a commercial transaction is protected by the
First Amendment).
187. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 467 (1995) (holding the
government to a high burden to justify its "wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression by
a massive number of potential speakers").
188. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
117 (1991) (subjecting Son of Sam law to First Amendment scrutiny because it operated as a "disin-
centive[] to speak").
189. Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 55-56 (using Will and Grace and Queer Eye for the
Straight Guy as examples).
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racist. We should acknowledge that systems of capital can facilitate hu-
man flourishing but also have an enormous effect on the end results of
that flourishing. Leaving that influence unchecked risks the consolidation
of power over cultural and social production in the hands of a few. Thus,
we may want to soften the effects of capital on practices that promote
cultural velocity through regulation of property and contract, rather than
through total bans on practices such as commodifying the body.
So what question should we answer when we embark on that
project? When should we regulate property and contract in the interest of
the special role the body may play in cultural velocity? I propose the
following standard: we should ask ourselves, to what degree does the
property transfer being contemplated, or the assertion of rights by the
property owner, raise the concern that an individual will lose the ability
to explore, form, and reform his identity as a social being?
a. Pain
If the control an individual seeks to submit himself to involves pain
or extended physical discomfort, the fear may be substantiated. For most
persons, subjection to pain and discomfort is cognitively difficult to
overcome. Of course, some persons are particularly lucky or resistant;
they do not mentally collapse even after years of torture or slavery. But
others lose all capacity to interact as social beings. Torture has been de-
scribed as "unmaking the world" of the victim for this reason. 190 Even
those in slavery who are not physically abused can often lose their sense
of agency in manufacturing a social identity. The embodied nature of our
subjectivities is why the infliction of physical pain through torture can
have this effect. In other words, even in the absence of any cultural
meaning that torture is disrespectful to the victim, acts like torture may,
via control of the body and infliction of pain, too greatly inhibit the indi-
vidual's development of an identity. 191
b. Duration
In addition to the degree of pain a particular intrusion on the body
entails, the duration of the consequences of subjection to the physical
control of another may be relevant to the capacity to form and reform
one's own identity. For instance, there is a substantiated risk that some-
one who sells an entire limb will undergo a change in his or her expe-
rience of the world so significant (and permanent) that it may be difficult
to cognitively overcome the feeling that one's identity has been al-
tered.192 Selling oneself into indentured servitude of permanent duration
190. SCARRY, supra note 117, at 37-38.
191. See Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 776-81.
192. See Miho iwakuma, The Body as Embodiment: An Investigation of the Body by Merleau-
Ponty, in DISABILITY/POSTMODERNITY, supra note 42, at 76, 81 (describing the phenomenon of
phantom limbs in amputees).
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would likely do something similar. But the fear that one will lose the
capacity to develop one's identity by selling blood or hair is far less
substantiated because neither of these losses is very permanent.
c. Cultural Meaning
Finally, if the control an individual seeks to give up is over the way
the body is culturally read and presented, this can implicate law's interest
in dispersing control over formation of identities. Thus, when employees
contract away to employers their rights to dress as they please, the inter-
est in dispersed control over bodies is implicated. This need not mean
that as the right is balanced against other interests, the right always pre-
vails. However, it does mean that positive regulation of such employ-
ment contracts might be one way of promoting cultural velocity through
individual rights to "bodily" exploration of identity.
In the next Part, I explore a few tentative examples of how we
might apply this standard in the United States. These examples will serve
to flesh out how the approach might be applied in a particular cultural
context. Even when we take into account current social realities about the
importance of the body, the legal rights we would then recognize will
look different than traditional rights to bodily integrity we have seen
before. The examples will necessarily not be comprehensive, and of
course, application of the principle will sometimes involve a host of oth-
er considerations, especially when positive property and contract regula-
tion is considered. The purpose of the examples, however, is to help elu-
cidate the difference between rights in the human body and rights that
acknowledge the body's importance, but stop treating it as an end in it-
self.
V. EXAMPLES OF THE BODY'S RELATIONSHIP TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Applying a human or constitutional right that appropriately protects
the public interest in cultural velocity, as it relates to the practical impor-
tance of the body in cultural velocity, will necessarily require both nega-
tive rights against the state and positive property and contract regulation.
Only a combination of both negative rights and positive regulation can
help to ensure that the legal and social coercion that bodies are subject to
does not lead to consolidated control over culture in the hands of a po-
werful few.
Some of these example applications will result in very familiar neg-
ative rights against the state, ones that both dignitarians and libertarians
promote, such as the right to refuse medical treatment or other state at-
tempts to mandate changes to the body. Other familiar rights against the
state would include the right to change one's own body, such as the right
to obtain tattoos and piercings, to cross-dress, or to purchase medical
treatment.
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Other applications will consist of protecting rights that increase cul-
tural velocity against private regulation, resulting in property regulation
that many dignitarians would agree with, but that strong libertarians
would reject. For instance, we might limit the ability to sell one's own
body part when that sale would result in long term physical pain and thus
cognitively interfere with the ability to develop and reform one's identi-
ty.
There will also be applications of cultural velocity to protect rights
against private coercion that would be totally unfamiliar to either the
dignitarian or libertarian approaches. For instance, my approach might
lead us to regulate exchanges in ordinary chattel, such as certain implants
and prosthetics. Still other forms of regulation might consist in exten-
sions of employment and housing law, protecting people with different
bodies from discrimination in these realms.
I also describe in this Part some examples of property and contract
regulation, such as total bans on prostitution and organ selling, that do
not in fact further properly conceived "rights in the body." This is despite
the fact that such regulation is frequently justified on the grounds that it
protects against commodification of the body.
A. Rights Against State Intrusion-from Torture to Forced Vaccination
Applying the cultural velocity principle to questions of state intru-
sion into the body would likely result in the recognition of a relatively
familiar negative right against state intrusion into the body. This is be-
cause embodied subjectivity creates the danger that many forms of state
intrusion on bodies are too cognitively difficult to overcome. If the state
can intrude on one's body, and can thereby direct our subjective expe-
riences, this may lead to state suppression of different ways of living,
different experiences, and different identities, all of which generally con-
tribute to cultural evolution when left unpunished by criminal law.
Thus, rights to resist severe state imposed pain' 93 or very invasive or
permanent medical treatment,194 such as forced sterilization,' 95 would
likely be included within an application of the cultural velocity approach,
just as they would likely be included in the "bodily integrity" rights pro-
tected under many dignitarian and autonomy approaches.
193. Cf Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1530 (2008) (noting that what many forbidden punish-
ments under the Eighth Amendment "had in common was the deliberate infliction of pain for the
sake of pain-'superadd[ing]' pain to the death sentence through torture and the like" (alteration in
original)).
194. E.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997) (clarifying that the right to refuse medical
treatment rests in the right "to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching").
195. E.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 534 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) (describing the
now discredited but "once-pervasive" forced sterilization of persons with disabilities).
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On the other hand, mandatory vaccination does not entail a great
degree of pain, the pain felt does not last very long, and the cultural
meaning of being marked as a person with or without a vaccination is not
very significant to most persons' identity. Thus, no fundamental right to
refuse vaccination should stem from the special relationship of the body
to rights. This does not mean that rights to refuse vaccination could not
stem from other sources, such as religious freedoms. 196 But the argument
that rights to bodily integrity or control over one's body should entail
rights to refuse vaccination are too fetishistic about the body, subscribing
to the fiction that our bodies could ever be "free" from all intrusion that
implicates dignity or autonomy.
B. Rights to Change One's Body-From Abortion to Cross Dressing
Applying the principle to the question of rights to proactively modi-
fy and treat one's body would also likely result in relatively familiar neg-
ative rights against state criminalization of those modifications and
treatments, such as abortion, 197 or treatments that are necessary to avoid
pain.198 A right to purchase many forms of medical treatment, or even
"upgrades" to "healthy" or "normal" bodies, would also likely fall within
the scope of rights we would want to protect in order to promote cultural
velocity.
In this way, any "bodily" right protected under cultural velocity
would be quite different from the American constitutional right to bodily
integrity, which distinguishes between rights to resist intrusion into the
body and rights to modify one's own body. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized a fundamental right to refuse life sustaining medi-
cal treatment, but has not recognized a fundamental right to contract for
assistance in committing suicide through the use of medication. 99 But
the cultural velocity principle would not make this distinction because
the right is not grounded merely in the "integrity" of the body, nor even
merely in avoiding physical pain.
196. E.g., In re Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 91
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that under First Amendment, religious exemption to New York's mandato-
ry inoculation program for school children must be extended to all persons who sincerely hold reli-
gious beliefs, and not just persons who are bona fide members of a recognized religious organiza-
tion).
197. SeeRoev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
198. Some Supreme Court justices have indicated that they would find constitutional fault with
laws that prohibit the administration of pain medication necessary to alleviate great suffering, even
in instances where the administration of the medicine is virtually certain to cause death. Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-37 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The parties and amici
agree that in these States a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing
great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that
suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death.").
199. Compare Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990), with Vacco, 521
U.S. at 807.
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The principle also recognizes the importance of the body as a means
of exploring and forming a cultural identity, and would therefore likely
protect choices to engage in numerous kinds of body modifications, such
as abortions, surgical and hormonal sex change procedures, cosmetic
surgery, tattooing, piercing, and perhaps the ingestion of "mind altering"
drugs. Again, rights are rarely absolute in any constitutional system, so
professional and safety regulation of many of these practices would like-
ly pass muster, as they do in the American constitutional system.2°
The right to cross dress, and indeed, to dress as one pleases in pub-
lic generally, would likely also be appropriately protected, even though
dress and the use of jewelry do not involve the alteration of one's "natu-
ral" body. I have argued for such a freedom of dress in a prior work, but
it is not on solid footing in American constitutional law.2°' Of course, as
with all rights, sometimes the right will need to be balanced against other
rights and other interests. Thus, threatening exercises of dress, such as
indecent exposure committed with intent to harass and threaten, or the
wearing of dangerous weapons as part of an "outfit," could be regulated,
but the point remains that some kind of countermajoritarian right to ma-
nipulate one's appearance would make sense under the cultural velocity
principle's application to the special importance of our bodies.
C. Rights to Use One's Body-from Sexual Liberty to Verbal Harassment
A right to sexual liberty202 might also be grounded in this cultural
velocity principle. Sexual activity is a use of the body that is largely de-
scribed as having important components of physicality, just as the free-
dom to manipulate one's appearance through dress was historically de-
scribed as a bodily freedom.20 3 Moreover, sexual activity is one impor-
tant means in many cultures of forming cultural affiliations and identity.
But would recognition of the body's importance to cultural velocity
principle mean that we would protect every single use of the body?
Could I claim that because my verbal harassment of another person in-
volves use of my mouth that it is protected under the right? Could I claim
that because thinking involves my brain, which is part of my body, an
inquiry into my intent to commit a crime is an intrusion into my rights
over my body?
200. For instance, the right to obtain an abortion may be limited by health and safety regula-
tions throughout pregnancy. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874-78 (1992).
201. Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 16-17 (describing Supreme Court's denial of certiorari on
the issue in the face of a circuit split).
202. Cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (finding criminalization of same sex
sodomy between consenting adults in private to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
203. See James Allon Garland, Breaking the Enigma Code: Why the Law has Failed to Recog-
nize Sex as Expressive Conduct Under the First Amendment, and Why Sex Between Men Proves that
it Should, 12 L. & SEXUALITY 159, 180-87 (2003) (using the example of relationships between gay
men to demonstrate the expressive nature of sex).
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Recognition of the body's importance to cultural velocity, as a prac-
tical reason to select certain bodily-identity performative behaviors for
legal protection, would not provide a reason for selecting speech or
thought for legal protection. Those reasons would have to be articulated
separately. This is because the cultural velocity conception has aban-
doned any idea that rights should map onto the physical borders of the
human body. Thus, not every use or modification of the human body will
necessarily implicate the body in a manner relevant to cultural velocity.
Those uses that, as a cultural matter, tend to be experienced and unders-
tood as implicating subjectivity and cultural performance will be the uses
that sit at the core of the fight. This is why dress would be a more plausi-
ble candidate for protection than verbal speech, despite the fact that ver-
bal speech involves a great deal of movement of one's mouth-part of
the human body-while dress may not involve the movement of any part
of the human body. Dress merely involves the placement of chattel upon
the human body.
D. Patent Law
Beyond these mostly familiar negative rights against the state, ap-
plying the cultural velocity principle would also likely result in some
rather unfamiliar forms of property regulation. For instance, it is possible
that we might want to restrict end user license agreements ("EULAs") in
certain forms of chattel because they would threaten individual innova-
tion and ability to form and reform identity. We wouldn't ignore the im-
plications of sellers retaining property rights in highly personal chattel
just because it's chattel, rather than part of the organic body.
As one example, we might want to restrict the enforcement of EU-
LAs against users of prostheses and other medical technology that inti-
mately affects mobility, perception, or communication. This would in-
clude items like cochlear implants, robotic arms, visual aids, wheel-
chairs, and the like. While the idea that patent holders on these technolo-
gies would enforce EULAs against patients may seem far-fetched, the
possibility that they would do so in a future in which many of these de-
vices are "elective" is much stronger. If Apple is willing to enforce such
agreements against purchasers of iPhones,2°4 would it not consider en-
forcing them against purchasers of computer or phone implants? Memo-
ry card implants?
We might even want to simply restrict the enforcement of EULAs
against users of any technology deeply tied to identity formation, wheth-
er or not it has anything to do with physicality or the body. It may be that
204. Katie Hafner, Altered iPhones Freeze up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007 at CI, available at
2007 WLNR 19068410 ("Jennifer Bowcock, an Apple spokeswoman, said that when people went to
update their software with their computer through iTunes, a warning appeared on the computer
screen, making it clear that any unauthorized modifications to the iPhone software violated the
agreement that people entered into when they bought the phone.").
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the importance of the body will start to drop away, over time, and will no
longer be a pragmatic, culturally appropriate way of singling out some
identity formative practices from others for legal protection. The number
of persons who find their phones, Facebook accounts, and other items to
be more foundational to identity than even a prosthesis or their clothing
may be growing. The cultural velocity approach is well-suited to deal
with these sorts of changing conditions because it is an empirically falsi-
fiable, consequentialist approach.
E. Employment and Housing Law
Another relatively unfamiliar area in which we might want to pro-
mote cultural velocity as it relates to bodily identity performance is in the
regulation of employment and housing contracts. The U.S. economic
system provides very minimal welfare rights, and indeed, provides no
welfare entitlements to those who are considered able to work but do
not.20 5 Thus, the process of entering into employment and housing con-
tracts for most adults in the U.S. is essential. With respect to the
workplace, statutes like the Civil Rights Act of 1964206 have made the
American workplace more integrated and diverse along culturally salient
categories such as race than many other private institutions such as
churches or social clubs.20 7 The workplace is already a venue where
Americans can learn about those with different identities, where we can
be challenged. 0 8
We have already made statutory moves toward accommodating dif-
ferences in bodies in both the employment and housing contexts, and we
do not limit ourselves only to those differences in bodies which are fully
biologically determined. For instance, we forbid discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, and skin color 2° 9 in these contexts, even though both
race and sex can be thought of as socially constructed in part. We also
require reasonable accommodation, at least in principle, of persons with
disabilities at work and in school.2 1°
205. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 permitted
states to stop paying benefits to those otherwise eligible for welfare assistance if the recipient did not
engage in qualified work. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 407, 110 Stat. 2105, 2129-34 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2006)).
206. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e- Ito -17 (2006).
207. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L.J. I, 17 (2000) ("[E]ven the partial demographic integration that does exist in the workplace
yields far more social integration-actual interracial interaction and friendship-than any other
domain of American society.").
208. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101,
112 (1995) ("The workplace functions not only as a self-governing institution and as a regulated
institution; it also functions as a crucial intermediate institution that stands between the individual
and the state.").
209. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 3601-3619 (2006).
210. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
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However, we may want to expand this to accommodating not just
biological or "accidental" difference, but also other differences in bodies.
We may protect the ability of employees in their use of chattel closely
related to the body, such as clothing, jewelry, or hairstyling. 21 1 We might
also protect transgender employees, who change the gender presentation
of their bodies through both surgical and somewhat more superficial
changes. We could also protect transgender persons and persons who
dress unusually from being excluded from housing. When it comes to
this kind of private regulation of rights, a workable way of protecting
rights in this private context will of course require a great deal of finesse.
One appropriate way to balance the many interests at stake would be to
require reasonable accommodation of employee differences in dress in
most workplaces and provide statutory exceptions for certain jobs such
as modeling or acting.
212
Protections from sexual orientation discrimination could be con-
ceived of as a means of promoting the right as well, as sexual conduct is
certainly in the United States a means of exploring and forming identity
through the use of the body.
Finally, we could consider expanding the kinds of bodies we rea-
sonably accommodate in workplaces and schools beyond those currently
protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act. Perhaps a body need
not be "disabled" to the point of impairment in a "major life function"
for us to recognize that it represents a different identity we may want
others to interact with and learn from.2 13
Under this framework, persons who choose not to or cannot afford
to "upgrade" their bodies through the use of drugs (such as steroids) and
other biotechnology could be protected against unjust workplace or edu-
cational exclusion through reasonable accommodation of their compara-
tive disadvantages and differences. However, the protections would not
necessarily be great-"reasonable accommodation" is, after all, a rela-
tively weak mandate. As a result, those who did not alter their bodies and
therefore became less adept at truly core job functions would likely be
left unprotected. I choose the weak requirement of reasonable accommo-
dation purposefully as an example of what protecting rights to have a
different body in a private sphere such as the workplace might look like.
211. 1 have proposed just this in a prior article, Freedom of Dress. See Ramachandran, supra
note 9, at 37-43.
212. Id. at 61-64.
213. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") such
that the protected class of disabled persons it protects is quite narrowly defined. E.g., Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1999) (finding that severely myopic job applicants
were not disabled within meaning of the Act because they could use corrective lenses, and therefore
received no protection from discrimination by the defendant employer on the basis of the myopia).
The ADA was recently amended, however, to clarify that the coverage should be broad. ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555-56 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102 (West 2009)).
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This relatively weak protection takes seriously the fact that some
degree of coercion over bodies is inevitable. There will likely be eco-
nomic incentives to take enhancing medication or alter one's body in
other ways in the future, just as there are economic incentives to obtain
cosmetic surgery that makes one more attractive now, and economic
incentives to wear contact lenses or even obtain LASIK surgery. Because
this coercion is inevitable, the aim of property and contract regulation to
protect rights in the body can never be to provide absolute, substantive
equality or absolute "freedom" for different bodies. The aim can only be
to soften the effects of capital and other sources of private power on the
variety of bodies and identities that become part of our culture-to pre-
vent the consolidation of power over culture through power over bodies.
F. Welfare Law
With this in mind, we may be faced with body modifications in the
future that are so economically valuable we simply cannot accommodate
those who do not obtain them. Such accommodation may not be as easy
as accommodation of visual or hearing impairments in many professions.
For instance, we might be faced with the development of technology that
dramatically expands memory or other components of intellectual ca-
pacity.
Thus, we might find it simpler at times to just redistribute wealth
more dramatically, as a means of ensuring that those without capital re-
tain a degree of material security no matter what they do or do not do to
their bodies. This is certainly not strong protection, since all it would
likely guarantee is that having an unusual body will not lead to starvation
or homelessness. But we might argue that more generous welfare bene-
fits are required for precisely this reason.
It is also worth pointing out that currently, we do not even have pro-
tection against starvation and homelessness for persons with unusual
bodies, persons who are challenging our social norms. Transgender per-
sons, for instance, are so marginalized under American law that they
often become homeless and their very existence essentially crimina-
214lized. No welfare system ensures basic material security for transgend-
er persons, as even sex segregated homeless shelters are often unable to
provide security.21 5
As another reform of welfare law, we might also provide welfare
entitlements to obtain some economically valuable body modifications,
214. Spade, supra note 123, at 751-52.
215. Id. at 752-53 (describing how a host of laws, including gender documentation require-
ments even for driver's licenses, create a lack of access to employment and housing, and unsafe
conditions at homeless shelters for many transgender persons).
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to ensure that those with fewer financial resources and their progeny are
not locked out of future opportunity and cultural participation.2 16
In fact, some prominent members of the "transhumanist" movement
have predicted that once extremely valuable technology modifying the
body is available, the masses will simply "demand" a dramatic wealth
redistribution.2t 7 This is meant to respond to egalitarian concerns that
body modifying or improving technology could widen the gap between
poor and rich too far.218
While I find this prediction to be overly optimistic, the core point is
a fair one-perhaps generous welfare law is a more direct instrument
with which to deal with the inequality that social and cultural coercion
over bodies inevitably causes. This makes sense once we have recog-
nized that private property rights already threaten persons' control over
their bodies. If that is the case, welfare law, rather than rights to "bodily
integrity" or "personhood," may sometimes be the most effective way of
protecting the ability to have a different or unusual body.
G. Body Commodification-From Prostitution to Organ Selling
Are there some sales of the body's parts or uses that must be prohi-
bited, or that cannot be prohibited? There are some sales of the body or
its parts that we might legitimately be concerned with from the perspec-
tive of protecting the public interest in cultural velocity. This is because
we might legitimately be concerned that those with economic power and
other forms of private influence could obtain too much control over cul-
ture by obtaining too much control over bodies. On the other hand, not
every commodification of the "natural" body need be categorically for-
bidden, because not every commodification of the natural body impli-
216. The United Nations Convention on The Rights of Persons with Disabilities represents an
important move towards welfare rights to certain aids. Section (g) of Article 4 states an obligation of
parties to "undertake or promote research and development of, and to promote the availability and
use of new technologies, including information and communications technologies, mobility aids,
devices and assistive technologies, suitable for persons with disabilities, giving priority to technolo-
gies at an affordable cost." G.A. Res. 61/106, art. IV, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007).
Article 20 states that parties "shall take effective measures to ensure personal mobility with the
greatest possible independence for persons with disabilities." Id. at art. XX. This includes
"[flacilitating access by persons with disabilities to quality mobility aids, devices, assistive technol-
ogies and forms of live assistance and intermediaries, including by making them available at afford-
able cost." Id.
217. HUGHES, supra note 45, at 214-15.
218. Id.:
It is unlikely that a future majority of service-providing 'commoners' with more free
time, communications and democracy than today would tolerate being lorded over by a
dynasty of non-working hereditary capitalists. They would vote to change the system.
The trend in the social democracies has been to equalize income by raising the standards
of the poorest as high as the economy can bear. In the age of robots, that minimum will
be very high.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting HANS MORAVEC, ROBOT: MERE MACHINE TO
TRANSCENDENT MIND 132 (2000)).
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cates this concern. But are there any sales of body parts or uses that must
be permitted, from the perspective of protecting cultural velocity?
1. Prostitution
The best example of body commodification that arguably must be
permitted under a proper understanding of the relationship of the body to
rights is prostitution. Prostitution does not inherently involve pain, nor
does it inherently involve indentured servitude or a use of the body that
is extremely long in duration. Moreover, the long term physical effects of
sexual activity, when engaged in with protections such as condoms, may
be less significant than the long term physical effects of other forms of
labor we permit, such as repetitive factory work.
Of course, the cultural and social meaning of engaging in sexual ac-
tivity with another can be very significant, but forbidding all profits from
activities that involve identity exploration, or from culturally meaningful
acts, is unlikely to "protect" these activities in an otherwise essentially
capitalist context. It is more likely to simply disincentivize them. This is
why the United States Supreme Court has recognized that forbidding
profits altogether from certain kinds of speech is usually an overbroad
restriction on that speech.21 9 It is also why, when I argued for a freedom
of dress, I did not argue that modeling and acting should be outlawed.22°
Thus, it is arguable that not only should we abandon the claim that pros-
titution violates fundamental rights to bodily integrity, but we should
also recognize a fundamental right to engage in prostitution, given the
importance of sexual activity to identity formation and culture.
One might ask, does sex really need to be incentivized, the way cer-
tain forms of speech need to be incentivized? Do we really need financial
incentives for sexual identity formation and exploration? The kind of sex
that is culturally "normal" probably needs little additional financial in-
centive for persons to experiment with it. But some kinds of unusual or
culturally challenging sexual experiences will probably happen more
often in the United States if prostitution is legalized. For instance, per-
sons with certain disabilities and disfigurements may be more likely to
have sexual experiences if prostitution is legalized. 221 Alternately, some
of these culturally challenging practices might be made more culturally
visible, and actually have some effect on cultural norms regarding sex-
219. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468-70 (1995).
220. Indeed, I proposed categorically exempting these jobs from reasonable accommodation of
dress requirements. Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 63-64.
221. See Lucas, supra note 22, at 253 ("[l1n our nonideal world some individuals may be
limited to a choice between commodified sex and involuntary celibacy."). See generally Elizabeth F.
Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State's Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1307, 1385 (2009) (including information on state subsidies in some countries for the purchase
of prostitution services by persons with disabilities).
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uality, if prostitution is legal and more persons can "admit" to having
sexual experiences with persons that are culturally disfavored sexually.
222
Of course, sexual activity can be experienced as a bodily intrusion
that affects one's very identity, even one's capacity to develop a different
identity in the future.2 3 Thus, many forms of regulation of prostitution
may be wholly appropriate, and because any right to prostitution would
not be grounded in "autonomy," such regulation would not necessarily
infringe upon the right. Some examples of appropriate regulation could
be laws that seek strong assurance of consent, laws requiring safe prac-
tices to prevent disease and pregnancy, laws ensuring the ability of par-
ties to change their minds, and perhaps periodic surveillance or inspec-
tion to prevent violence. Even taxing the proceeds of prostitution and
using the funds for mandatory counseling or other activities designed to
ensure that the identity of the prostitute is not destroyed might be appro-
priate.
But in the face of arguments from sex workers that the work need
not be destructive to identity formation and reformation, and in the face
of the fact that we permit adults to take these risks with their physical
bodies in the context of unpaid sex, prostitution appears to be a commo-
dification of the body that we ought to legalize under a practical applica-
tion of the cultural velocity principle, even one that accounts for the im-
portance of sexual practice as a use of the body to identity formation.
Arguably, some legal form of prostitution is even required as a matter of
fundamental rights.
2. Organ Selling
Organ selling, in contrast, is a form of body commodification that
involves lasting physical effects on the body. Thus, societies may be
rightly concerned that those who sell organs might be selling away an
aspect of their very subjectivity, in a manner that could affect their abili-
ty to explore many possible identities and cultural affiliations. But this is
likely not the case for every organ or organ sale.
Selling one's eyes, a hand, or another such body part intimately in-
volved in sensory perception or mobility may have lasting effects on
one's identity that the seller regrets. On the other hand, selling a kidney
seems less problematic with respect to this public interest in cultural evo-
lution and change. Certainly the loss of a kidney entails future medical
risk and even perhaps some experiences of pain that last well into the
future. Thus, there are reasons to regulate such sales heavily to ensure
222. Cf Lucas, supra note 22, at 261 ("Another benefit of commodification would be that...
prostitutes could openly discuss their work, describe its pros and cons .... Customers could frankly
discuss their experiences, both in the crass, economic way that commodification critics fear but also
in honest terms about... what needs they seek to fill.").
223. See id. at 257-58.
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fully informed consent. But a categorical prohibition on kidney sales
does not appear to further the legitimate public interest in protecting in-
dividuals from contracting away their ability to form diverse identities.
On the other hand, there doesn't appear to be any reason to categor-
ically protect a right to sell organs under this approach, either. Organ
donation is not a particularly culturally salient practice, nor does it seem
to involve physical experiences that are part of identity exploration, the
way sexual acts arguably do. Moreover, most people donating organs are
anesthetized during the process-it is not a bodily experience in which
the donor is generally attempting to change or control his or her subjec-
tivity, even temporarily. Thus, it is neither particularly "personal" in the
sense of importance to subjective experience, nor particularly "political"
in the sense of identity performative.
There may be traditional utilitarian concerns that would lead to bans
on organ selling and other commodifications of the body, such as selling
blood. The economic stability of a community and public health con-
cerns are two potential reasons. And there may be traditional utilitarian
concerns that would lead to permitting organ selling or other commodifi-
cations such as selling blood-we might want to increase the supply of
organs, for instance. But these concerns need not be couched in terms of
a fundamental right to bodily integrity, human dignity, or autonomy.
H. Animal-Human and Plant-Human Chimeras
What about the patenting of animal-human or plant-human chime-
ras, or transgenic entities,224 that has raised so much new concern over
assigning the legal status of property to persons or their parts?
225
If an animal-human or plant-human chimera is capable of cultural
interaction and affiliation, or of identity group formation and reforma-
tion, then it would seem that the cultural velocity principle would require
us to forbid patent owners from controlling these entities in these activi-
ties.
It is important to note here that because of the way I have grounded
the rights we protect under law, I am not requiring these entities to have
"human intelligence" or to be capable of full political participation in
order to be possessed of rights. Thus, my theory also protects almost all
persons with disabilities, including those with mental disabilities. Even if
a person with a severe mental disability never develops to the stage of
traditional political participation, he is capable of identity performance
and cultural affiliation, as well as of social attachments that are instruc-
224. See Munzer, supra note 57, at 124 (providing definitions of these terms).
225. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 2, at 546; see also supra notes 50, 60, 62-64, 66 and accom-
panying text.
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226tive and useful to society. But some minimal level of "intelligence" or
cognitive processing is probably required for a being to attain the kinds
of identities or bodily identity performances that could contribute to our
cultural evolution.
Although a proper conception of how the body relates to rights may
ultimately prevent a patent-holder from exercising control over the be-
ings she creates, the principle I have articulated would not necessarily
prevent a patent holder from preventing another person or company from
producing identical beings for the duration of the patent. This portion of
the patent right does not seem to lastingly affect our interest in cultural
evolution or cultural velocity. Thus, a patent holder in an animal-human
chimera or transgenic creature might see his or her patent rights dimi-
nished, but not destroyed, under a proper conception of the body's rela-
tionship to fundamental rights.
It may seem strange for a company to hold a patent in the method of
producing an entity that has intelligence, interacts with others, and is a
member of society. But this state of affairs is not without analogy in laws
with which we are familiar. Not long ago, children were treated like the
property of their fathers.227 But parents do not exercise absolute domi-
nion over their children. For instance, parents cannot abuse or neglect
their children in the United States. And even in the past, fathers had du-
ties of care to their children. 228 Moreover, once children reach adulthood,
parents exercise no dominion or control over their children at all. And
yet, this recognition that parents should not have total control over their
children need not stop us from using property rights to govern control
over embryos that parents have contributed to genetically. Allowing a
parent to sell an embryo or donate rights in the embryo to another parent
is not the same as allowing a parent to exercise dominion over a child. 29
CONCLUSION
The problem of property and freedom of contract threatening fun-
damental rights is not new. However, the physical merger of humans and
non-humans is about to become prominent. Thus, we can no longer sub-
scribe to the fiction that by drawing a sharp line between humans and the
226. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 79, at 99, 129 (describing her "conception of the person as a
social animal, whose dignity does not derive from an idealized rationality," and also "the advantage
of understanding humanity and its diversity that comes from associating with mentally disabled
people on terms of mutual respect and reciprocity").
227. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-13 (1994) (describing the fathers' custody
over children as similar to the master/servant relationship, which involved duties of care, as well as
the ability to contract out and profit from a servant's labor).
228. Id. at 12-13.
229. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30
Hous. L. REV. 1597, 1648 (1993) ("[T]he holder of a patent for a transgenic human being could
presumably prevent others from making, using, or selling such a transgenic human being, but this
does not mean that the patent holder could impress the patented person into servitude or bondage.").
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rest of the world, and prohibiting the commodification of the human, we
have sufficiently protected the need for diverse exercises of human agen-
cy against property rights. Property rights and freedom of contract have
always threatened to stifle us via our bodies, such as by constructing us
as "disabled" rather than "abled," or by determining whether we will
need to perform physical labor to survive.
We must accept that the line between humans and property is being
blurred, and that already human self-control can be affected by the distri-
bution of property rights. To deal with threats to physical self-control we
cannot rely on the formal sanctity of the human body as separate from
property. At the same time, we cannot rely solely on unregulated, auton-
omy-based, property-like rights in the body. For the same reasons that all
forms of property are regulated, and do not entail sole dominion, proper-
ty-like rights in one's body should also sometimes be regulated.
We instead need a conception of rights that would simultaneously
protect the diverse set of bodily choices that form individuals' identities
and cultural affiliations, while using the regulation of property and con-
tract to protect against a few actors obtaining monopolies over the sub-
jectivities and identities of others. But because we are at least in part
products of technology, our rights to control our own subjectivities or to
form diverse identities cannot be protected by any kind of neat "right to
bodily integrity" or autonomy over the natural, human body.

